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ABSTRACT 
  In the mid-1990s, Congress fundamentally altered the public safety 
net when it passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, otherwise known as welfare 
reform. Under the PRWORA, cash assistance was no longer an 
entitlement for income-qualifying families; instead, recipients faced 
work requirements and lifetime limits on receiving benefits. Bipartisan 
reformers sought to transform welfare from a program believed to trap 
poor mothers in a “culture of dependence” into a program that would 
promote a culture of “self-sufficiency” and “personal responsibility.” 
This shift in culture, it was argued, would ultimately lead to upward 
mobility. This Article shows how, ironically, over twenty years after 
welfare reform, the private safety net that many struggling families rely 
on—the credit system—disincentivizes the very self-sufficient behavior 
that welfare reformers had hoped to promote. Using the sociological 
concept of narratives, the Article shows how parents who have most 
internalized narratives of self-sufficiency are particularly at risk of 
financial ruin under the new regime. On a broader scale, this Article 
argues that, to better understand the relationship between law, 
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inequality, and poverty, we need to further investigate how people 
experience and internalize structural conditions and how these 
structural conditions become sources of personal meaning and 
determinants of behavior. Such inquiries can lead to unexpected 
connections between seemingly disparate areas of law and policy, and 
ultimately to innovative policy interventions. 
  Finally, this Article moves to the prescriptive. It argues for a public 
financial services program, Financial Services for Family Security 
(FSFS). FSFS would provide services such as financial advising, no-
interest small loans, and debt management help, all aimed at increasing 
the financial resilience of struggling families. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, public benefits law was transformed, fundamentally 
altering the safety net for poor parents in the United States.1 Congress 
 
 1. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model 
for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 818 (2004) (“The widespread embrace of the 
personal choice model represents a sea change in American public benefits law. . . . This personal 
choice model of public benefits law differs fundamentally from any that came before it.”); see also 
KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN 
AMERICA 33 (2015) (“What is known, though, is that the way things turned out, the 1996 
reformers didn’t merely ‘replace’ welfare. They killed it.”); Monica Potts, The American Social 
Safety Net Does Not Exist, NATION (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-
american-social-safety-net-does-not-exist/ [https://perma.cc/CL2T-P4H6] (arguing that since 
welfare reform the public safety net has largely disappeared).  
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passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,2 which ended a sixty-year-old 
program that had entitled qualifying families to cash assistance. 
Despite debate about the specifics of the PRWORA, there was 
widespread, bipartisan agreement that change was needed because the 
existing welfare program’s structure unintentionally disincentivized 
work and promoted dependency.3 President Bill Clinton said when he 
announced the welfare reform bill, “Today the Congress will vote on 
legislation that gives us a chance . . . to transform a broken system that 
traps too many people in a cycle of dependence to one that emphasizes 
work and independence, to give people on welfare a chance to draw a 
paycheck, not a welfare check.”4 Indeed, one of the four stated 
statutory goals of the PRWORA was to “end the dependence of needy 
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, 
and marriage.”5 
The new program designed to meet this and other statutory goals, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), imposed lifetime 
limits on receiving aid, subjected able-bodied participants to work 
requirements, incentivized states to cut welfare rolls, and transformed 
welfare into a block grant program that gave states wide flexibility in 
how they spend welfare funds.6 By 2016, the number of welfare 
 
 2. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 3. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 537–38 (1995) (describing “bipartisan consensus on 
work-based welfare reform,” “widespread dissatisfaction with traditional welfare 
administration,” and “an apparent political consensus in support of reforms that in some way link 
welfare and work”). Alstott also notes that a “common criticism” of the existing welfare system 
was that it “rewards the ‘dependent’ poor but provides too little assistance to the working poor.” 
Id. at 538. Research had found that single mothers who chose to work instead of receive welfare 
experienced more material hardship than their counterparts who remained on welfare. See 
KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE 
WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK, at xix, 220 (1997) (describing research supporting the 
proposition that mothers who worked and received low wages were generally worse off than their 
counterparts who received welfare). 
 4. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Welfare Reform Legislation and an Exchange 
with Reporters (July 31, 1996), in 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1379, 1379 (1996).  
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012).  
 6. See Alana Semuels, The End of Welfare as We Know It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-end-of-welfare-as-we-know-it/476322/ 
[https://perma.cc/3477-GHKE] (describing the changes the TANF program brought to welfare); 
see also EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 25 (describing how the new block-granting structure 
“essentially capped funding for the program”); Liz Schott, Ladonna Pavetti & Ife Finch, How 
States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Under the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES passim (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-7-
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recipients had fallen to only 2.7 million7 from a peak of 14.2 million 
recipients in 1994,8 a drop of 81 percent. Now, twenty years after 
welfare was reformed, the public safety net is by many accounts dead.9 
The idea behind TANF was that parents would work and, if their 
income was below a specified level,10 their earnings would be 
supplemented by the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).11 Thus, a 
robust cash assistance program for people who were not working 
would no longer be needed.12 When President Clinton signed the 
welfare reform bill into law, he said “The best antipoverty program is 
still a job.”13 He promised that welfare reform would “reward the work 
of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the principle that if 
you work 40 hours a week and you’ve got a child in the house, you will 
no longer be in poverty.”14 
But whether or not parents found a job, periods of financial 
 
12tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN7U-AFNZ] (providing an overview of how states have used their 
TANF block grants). 
 7. TANF Caseload Data 2016, OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data-2016 [https://perma.cc/U7XK-FDLP]. 
 8. Caseload Data 1994 (AFDC Total), OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Dec. 19, 2004), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/caseload-data-afdc-1994-total [https://perma.cc/7VC8-PQCA]. 
 9. See EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 33 (“What is known, though, is that the way things 
turned out, the 1996 reformers didn’t merely ‘replace’ welfare. They killed it.”); Potts, supra note 
1. Reports of localities actively discouraging parents from applying for and receiving public 
benefits are common, and have even been the subject of litigation. In Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. 
Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the plaintiffs attacked so-called “diversion” tactics of New York’s 
welfare agencies, contending that the policies and practices of agencies associated with 
distributing cash assistance programs like TANF and other federal benefits wrongfully denied 
eligible people of these benefits.  
 10. In 2016, for a person with two children filing as “Single, Head of Household or 
Widowed,” the earnings cutoff for the EITC was $44,648. For a person with two children filing as 
“Married, Filing Jointly,” the earnings cutoff for the EITC was $50,198. 2016 EITC Income Limits, 
Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/eitc-income-limits-
maximum-credit-amounts [https://perma.cc/TDP3-9VVM]. 
 11. The EITC is a refundable tax credit that supplements earnings of low-income workers. 
It is the “largest cash-transfer program for low-income workers with children.” Anne L. Alstott, 
Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 285 (2010). 
Additionally, the EITC has been called the “largest federal anti-poverty program.” Lawrence 
Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum 
Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 301 (2004). The EITC is only available to people who work.  
 12. See supra note 11. 
 13. President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Aug. 22, 1996), in WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., 
supra note 4, at 1487, 1489.  
 14. President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on 
Administration Goals (Feb. 17, 1993), in 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 215, 220 (1993).  
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distress were common,15 and parents were left to find alternative forms 
of support. For many parents, this alternative support was credit.16 Just 
as welfare was reformed and the public safety net diminished, credit 
cards were becoming newly available to low-income families. Changes 
in state usury laws17 allowed lenders to extend credit to riskier 
borrowers while utilizing higher interest rates to make up for the 
increased risk.18 Credit card companies then began targeting low-
income consumers who just a decade before would not have qualified 
for credit cards.19 
 
 15. While work certainly provides some stability for families, the assumption that families 
can weather life events causing economic insecurity without an alternative safety net ignores two 
key issues. First, even if a person works forty hours per week, the wages former welfare recipients 
earn are not, by and large, enough to cover any unexpected life event such as a needed car repair, 
dental problem, or medical condition. For example, one study found that only 23.9 percent of 
families earning less than $20,000 per year and only 32.6 percent of families earning between 
$20,000 and $29,999 per year reported that they would certainly be able to or probably be able to 
come up with $2,000 in 30 days to cover an emergency expense. Annamaria Lusardi, Daniel 
Schneider & Peter Tufano, FINANCIALLY FRAGILE HOUSEHOLDS: EVIDENCE AND 
IMPLICATIONS, Brooking Papers on Econ. Activity, Spring 2011, at 83, 93 (2011), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 03/2011a_bpea_lusardi.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AY
A-YK5T]; see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax 
Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 545–47 (2013) (reporting a 
study of families receiving the EITC and documenting their difficulties covering unexpected 
financial emergencies). Second, during the booming economy of the 1990s, many former welfare 
recipients were able to find work. However, once the economy slumped during the economic 
downturn that started in 2007, the unemployment rates among families increased, as did the 
number of families in poverty and deep poverty. Policy Basics: And Introduction to TANF, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 5–7 (June 15, 2012), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F7Z-AJQV]. However, TANF rates responded 
only modestly to these changes in unemployment. Id. The bottom line is that TANF was created 
with the idea that almost anyone who wants a job can get one, but this is not the case during 
economic downturns. TANF does little to respond to changes in the economy and thus rates of 
unemployment and poverty. For example, between 2006 and 2015 the number of families in 
poverty nationwide rose by 7 percent, but the national TANF caseload fell by 21 percent. Ife 
Floyd, LaDonna Pavetti & Liz Schott, Policy Brief: TANF Reaching Few Poor Families, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 2 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/4-5-17tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WDH-TRZV]. 
 16. See Greene, supra note 15, at 547; see also Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of 
Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 457–59 
(2008) (“The most common explanation study participants gave for wanting to maintain access to 
credit cards was their usefulness in emergencies.”).  
 17. State usury laws that protected borrowers by regulating high interest rates were 
weakened. Katherine Porter, Driven by Debt, Bankruptcy and Financial Failure in American 
Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 1, 4 (Katherine Porter ed., 
2012).  
 18. David A. Lander, “It ‘Is’ the Best of Times, It ‘Is’ the Worst of Times”: A Short Essay on 
Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204–05 (2004).  
 19. Littwin, supra note 16, at 453. As Katherine Porter notes, these changes in credit 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] THE BOOTSTRAP TRAP 239 
Credit has become a lifeline for poor families, but many of them 
also find themselves in an enduring cycle of unmanageable debt.20 
These cycles of debt can wreak havoc on credit histories and scores.21 
And though credit histories were once tools used primarily by the 
financial industry to decide whether and how much money to loan 
consumers, they have taken on a new importance. In 2017, an 
increasing number of industries use credit histories to aid in their 
decisions about whether to grant access to a wide range of economic 
resources: rental housing, insurance, utilities, and jobs.22 A low credit 
score and flawed report can mean restricted access to institutions 
necessary for economic stability, and thus, the collateral consequences 
 
regulation also meant substantially increased debt for middle-class Americans. Porter, supra note 
17, at 4–5. 
 20. See J. Michael Collins, Paying for the Unexpected: Making the Case for a New Generation 
of Strategies to Boost Emergency Savings, Affording Contingencies, and Liquid Resources for 
Low-Income Families, in A FRAGILE BALANCE: EMERGENCY SAVINGS AND LIQUID 
RESOURCES FOR LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS 1, 2 (J. Michael Collins ed., 2015) (“Without savings, 
low-income households may have no choice but to turn to credit to make ends meet. . . . In theory, 
this sort of borrowing is a reasonable substitute for savings. However, emerging research suggests 
that using high-cost credit could make families worse off overall . . . .”); Greene, supra note 15, at 
547–57 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the use of credit by financially struggling 
families); Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low- and Moderate-Income 
Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 257, 263–78 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds., 2009) (“The credit 
card also provides a remarkably flexible safety net that can be deployed in response to unexpected 
financial crises. That protection is particularly important in the United States, where the public 
safety net is more porous than it is in many peer nations.” (citations omitted) (first citing RONALD 
J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 
(2006); then citing Jacob S. Hacker, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002); and citing CHRISTOPHER 
HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL 
POLICY (2007)).  
 21. For a description of how credit scores are determined and what information is included 
in credit reports, see infra Part II.  
 22. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 147–50, 164–66 (2016); see also SHAWN FREMSTAD 
& AMY TRAUB, DISCREDITING AMERICA: THE URGENT NEED TO REFORM THE NATION’S 
CREDIT REPORTING INDUSTRY 2–3 (2011) (noting that insurance agencies, employers, and other 
actors increasingly consider credit reports in their decisionmaking). Credit reporting is an 
expanding, multimillion-dollar industry. In 2011, Nationwide Consumer Reporting Agencies 
(NCRAs) generated U.S. revenues of about 4 billion dollars. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
KEY DIMENSIONS OF PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM 7 (2011). In 2012, 
almost half of employers conducted credit checks on job candidates at some point in the hiring 
process. SHRM Survey Findings: Background Checking–The Use of Credit Background Checks 
in Hiring Decisions, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (July 19, 2012), https://www.shrm.org/
hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GB7F-6VPH]. 
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of bad credit are profound.23 
This Article utilizes data from in-depth, semistructured interviews 
to unpack a previously undetected conflict in what remains of the 
safety net: the conflict between the goal of self-sufficiency and the risks 
that adhere when low-income families realize that goal. The post-
welfare reform public safety net promotes and even requires one type 
of behavior—self-sufficiency—but the new private safety net, which 
encompasses the credit reporting and scoring systems and 
accompanying regulations, is a danger to those who are both financially 
unstable and attempting to be self-sufficient. Those families that best 
adhere to the very behavior encouraged by the public safety net, then, 
end up at particular risk for long-term economic hardship. 
President Clinton promised that welfare reform would “give[] us 
a better chance to give those on welfare what we want for all families 
in America, the opportunity to succeed at home and at work.”24 This 
Article’s first contribution is detailing how welfare reform policy has 
interacted in a surprising way with our credit reporting system to deny 
many families who have “succeeded” in climbing out of a “culture of 
dependence,” “the opportunity to succeed at home and at work.” 
Unpacking the conflicts between the behavior promoted by the public 
safety net and the behavior necessary to succeed in the private credit 
market—the new private safety net—ideally will lead to new insights 
about what kind of safety net structure might be necessary to support 
families, rather than thwart them in their journeys toward self-
sufficiency and financial resilience. The tension in the existing safety 
net ultimately leads to the conclusion that a new public safety net 
program is needed. From a public policy perspective, the existing safety 
net penalizes the very behavior many policymakers across the political 
spectrum say that they want to encourage and incentivize.25 And from 
an equality standpoint, the current safety net works to exacerbate 
poverty and inequality, rather than to reduce it. 
To that end, this Article’s second contribution is the exploration 
 
 23. See FREMSTAD & TRAUB, supra note 22, at 2–3 (noting that insurance agencies, 
employers, and other actors increasingly consider credit reports in their decisionmaking, with 
negative effects for those with negative credit history); Amy Traub, Discredited: How 
Employment Credit Checks Keep Qualified Workers out of a Job, DĒMOS 3–4 (2013), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discredited-Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BF3H-SU4J] (describing how poor credit can negatively affect one’s employment prospects). For 
examples of the collateral consequences of bad credit, see Part III.B.  
 24. Clinton, supra note 4, at 1379.  
 25. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 21; Alstott, supra note 3, at 537–38. 
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of how a public safety net program might be designed to promote 
financial resilience in families by helping them to avoid the pitfalls of 
the punishing credit system. This Article argues that the existing safety 
net fails many families and that a new program is needed—one that 
allows families to adhere to their desire to be self-sufficient, but also 
provides families with the financial guidance and tools necessary to 
weather financial instability. This Article proposes a program called 
Financial Services for Family Security (FSFS), which would embrace 
the reality of rising financial instability for families in the United 
States26 and equip parents with a comprehensive set of tools to 
overcome financial emergencies and continue on their road to upward 
mobility. 
Finally, this Article and the methods employed provide a useful 
case study to help define a broader research agenda for scholars of law, 
poverty, and inequality. Recently, there has been a renewed focus 
among legal scholars on the connection between law, inequality, and 
poverty.27 Much of this work has fallen into two distinct categories. 
Several scholars have made great strides in theorizing the role of the 
Constitution as it relates to economic inequality, often from a historical 
perspective.28 Other scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the 
ways in which structural conditions related to specific legal rules and 
systems can worsen or accentuate some of the vicious cycles of 
 
 26. See Collins, supra note 20, at 4–5 (describing increased volatility in both income and 
expenditures for low-income households and describing studies that support this proposition). 
 27. As Professor Olatunde C.A. Johnson wrote, the “new economic inequality discourse has 
preoccupied economists, garnered its own ‘beat’ in leading publications, led to bestselling books, 
transfixed current political debates, and now (finally) seduced legal academia.” Olatunde C.A. 
Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647, 1648 
(2016). For examples of work from legal scholars that is focused on law, poverty, and inequality, 
see infra notes 28–29. 
 28. See generally GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUTION 
(2017) (arguing that rising economic inequality in the United States threatens democracy in part 
because the Constitution was designed under the assumption that inequality would not be as 
significant as it is in the contemporary United States); Cynthia Estlund, The “Constitution of 
Opportunity” in Politics and in the Courts, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (2016) (arguing that the future 
prospects of the democracy of opportunity tradition are threatened by the political and economic 
forces that divide economically struggling whites and racial minorities); Mark Graber, The Second 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361 (2016) (exploring the partisan nature 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was viewed as necessary to unwind the economic order of 
slavery and provide for the equal citizenship of both blacks and whites); James Gray Pope, Why 
Is There No Socialism in the United States? Law and the Racial Divide in the American Working 
Class, 1676–1964, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2016) (explicating the central role played by law in 
creating and enforcing racial divisions by focusing on the suppressive effects of a series of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on the black vote and interracial cooperation). 
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disempowerment associated with poverty and inequality.29 These lines 
of research are important and contribute to our understanding of law’s 
relationship to inequality and poverty. What is often absent from these 
existing accounts, however, is what we can glean only by engaging in 
in-depth interviews with those directly affected by the legal rules, 
systems, and processes we study: an understanding of how, in their 
actual social contexts, these actors experience, understand, and 
internalize the relevant legal rules and structures, and how these 
structures become sources of personal meaning and determinants of 
behavior. 
Indeed, by employing these methods, researchers are able to 
engage in “process tracking,” which helps to “discern how processes 
emerge and evolve.”30 These methods also allow researchers to 
understand how changes in structural conditions can interact with 
cultural mores to lead to unexpected outcomes. Such projects can, in 
turn, provide fruitful areas for further inquiry, large-scale data 
collection efforts, and ultimately innovative policy solutions.31  
 
 29. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015) (documenting the role banks have 
played in widening economic exclusion and inequality for poor Americans); Michelle Wilde 
Anderson, Colorblind Segregation: Equal Protection as a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 
CALIF. R. REV. 841 (2004) (discussing the structure and potential consequences of a colorblind 
segregation regime in public housing); Johnson, supra note 27 (arguing from empirical data that 
geography is the key to class-based and race-based inequality). 
 30. Michele Lamont & Patricia White, Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for 
Systematic Qualitative Research, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. 10 (2005), https://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/
ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW2K-5DSE]. 
 31. Sociologists regularly engage in in-depth, semistructured qualitative studies and 
ethnographies in their study of poverty and inequality. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 3, at 220; see 
generally MARIO LUIS SMALL, VILLA VICTORIA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
IN A BOSTON BARRIO (2004) (analyzing how poorer residents of a subsidized housing complex in 
Boston maintained social capital); MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN 
IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES (1999) (studying West Indian immigrants and 
how their culture and identities are “changed by conditions in America”). However, sociologists 
rarely focus on laws and legal systems as their primary area of inquiry. Qualitative methods are 
not new to legal academia, and indeed, there have been several influential law review articles and 
books based on qualitative methods. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (studying ranchers and farmers in rural 
California and finding that they settle disputes completely ignorant of their legal rights because 
most people in the area find the costs of learning about the law and submitting to formal 
resolution procedures so high that it is easier to fall back on norms); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963) 
(studying businessmen in contractual relations and finding that they frequently settle their 
disputes with neither regard for the original contract nor reference to potential legal sanctions 
because they believe that they can settle disputes better than their lawyers). My argument is that 
these methods should be incorporated into the renewed focus on studying the relationship 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the history of 
public benefits and welfare in the United States. It describes the 
cultural and accompanying policy shift in American society that 
emphasized personal responsibility and work as the basis for a reduced 
safety net. This Part not only shows how this ideology influenced policy 
and law surrounding safety net programs, but also shows how these 
programs were designed to penetrate the value systems of poor 
families. Finally, this Part explores existing research about how families 
have fared post-welfare reform. Part II discusses the rise of credit 
scores and credit reports in America. It begins by telling an often 
neglected, but vitally important, history of credit reporting in America. 
It then discusses how credit histories act as the new gatekeepers to 
many economic resources in the United States. 
Part III uses original data to show how the interaction of the 
culture prescribed by welfare reform and the rules of the credit system 
work together to produce counterproductive results: those families 
who have most internalized the culture promoted by welfare reformers 
are also at particular risk of financial failure under the new safety net. 
This Part explores the features of the current credit reporting system 
that perpetuate this counterproductive reality. Part IV discusses 
existing policy proposals that may help alleviate this counterproductive 
safety net structure and details some of the limitations of these 
proposals. Finally, Part V discusses the contours of the new program 
proposed, FSFS. FSFS is a government financial services agency that 
would provide families with tools to increase their financial resilience 
and stability, allowing them to continue on the road to upward 
mobility, rather than be thwarted by small emergencies. 
I.  WELFARE’S END: THE ERA OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
In the 1980s, the existing welfare regime offered more stability for 
poor families than did most work available to them.32 However, the 
financial and cultural landscape for poor Americans changed 
dramatically over the next fifteen or so years, concluding with the 
 
between law and inequality.  
 32. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 3, at 220 (“The real problem with the federal welfare system 
. . . was a labor-market problem . . . .[T]he kind of jobs [the interviewees] could get paid too little, 
offered little security in the short term, and provided few opportunities over time. Meanwhile, 
mothers who chose to work were even worse off . . . than their welfare counterparts.”). 
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PRWORA, a major transformation in public benefits law.33 This Part 
details a brief history of aid to poor families in America, highlighting 
the cultural shifts that culminated in the passage of the PRWORA in 
1996. It then provides an overview of what existing research reveals 
about the current state of former welfare recipients and poor parents. 
A. Welfare Reform, Dependency, and Responsibility 
Just over twenty years ago, “welfare as we [knew] it”34 ended. The 
1996 welfare reform bill, the PRWORA, replaced the program known 
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a new 
program, TANF. AFDC was a cash assistance entitlement program.35 
Poor women with children received a monthly stipend meant to 
provide children with “assistance at least great enough to provide, 
when added to the income of the family, a reasonable subsistence 
compatible with decency and health.”36 AFDC recipients were 
generally eligible for the cash benefits indefinitely, so long as they 
continued to have minor children and their incomes remained below a 
certain amount each month. TANF, on the other hand, has strict time 
limits that, once reached, make families ineligible for further aid.37 At 
the heart of TANF is an emphasis on “personal responsibility” and 
“self-sufficiency”—the goal is for parents to work and provide for 
themselves, rather than rely on the government to help keep their 
families afloat.38 
Welfare reform represented a major shift in American social 
welfare policy—a shift that was decades in the making.39 The complete 
 
 33. See Super, supra note 1, at 818 (“The widespread embrace of the personal choice model 
represents a sea change in American public benefits law. . . . This personal choice model of public 
benefits law differs fundamentally from any that came before it.”).  
 34. When President Clinton enacted welfare reform by signing TANF into law, he said 
“[t]oday, we are ending welfare as we know it.” Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill Amid 
Division, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1996, at A1.  
 35. Stephen B. Page & Mary B. Larner, Introduction to the AFDC Program, 7 FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 20, 21 (1997), https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/ 
07_01_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/W99Z-99A2] (“AFDC was a federally mandated program that 
guaranteed cash assistance to families with needy children.”). 
 36. Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of Work Expectations for Welfare 
Mothers, 7 FUTURE CHILD. 28, 30 (1997). 
 37. TANF-ACF-IM-2005-01 (Adherence to the Federal Five-Year Time Limit Provisions for 
FY 2003) for FY 2003 (2005), OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
ofa/resource/policy/im-ofa/2005/im-2005-01 [https://perma.cc/L9BX-X6KW]. 
 38. Clinton, supra note 13, at 1487–88 (discussing the goals of TANF, including self-
sufficiency rather than reliance on the government for monthly income).  
 39. Super, supra note 1, at 818. 
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political story of welfare reform has been ably told elsewhere.40 
However, to understand the changing economic landscape that 
contributed to the importance of credit for the poor, it is vital to 
understand both the cultural and structural changes promoted by 
welfare reform. 
Welfare began as mostly state-run programs for widowed mothers 
who had lost their husbands to the Civil War.41 Many states created 
mothers’ aid programs, which were designed to allow these mothers to 
take care of their children in their homes rather than put them in 
orphanages.42 During the Progressive Era of the 1930s, local mothers’ 
pension programs expanded and became part of an emerging national 
policy for women-led families.43 During the Great Depression, though, 
localities ran out of money to support such programs and the federal 
government stepped in to fill the void.44 In 1935, Aid to Dependent 
Children (then called ADC) was created as a federal solution to 
provide for the mothers who had previously been supported by 
localities.45 It was one of many social welfare programs created under 
the new Social Security Act of 1935,46 and the goal was to provide for 
children whose fathers were deceased, absent, or unable to work.47 
ADC was celebrated because it would allow poor single mothers 
to take care of their children full-time, rather than feel pressured to 
work.48 As enacted, the program was not limited to children of 
widows,49 but the focus was on families who had tragically lost a 
 
 40. See generally REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR 
FIGHTING POVERTY (1997) (describing in detail the story of welfare reform); Alstott, supra note 
3 (explaining the history of the EITC reforms); EDIN & SCHAEFER, supra note 1, at 1–33 
(discussing the hsitory of welfare and welfare reform); Vicki Lens, Public Voices and Public 
Policy: Changing the Social Discourse on “Welfare,” 39 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 137 (2002) 
(discussing the politicized language that comprised the discourse on welfare reform);  
 41. See EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11; GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 1 
(1998) (“During the second decade of the twentieth century, progressive women activists invented 
welfare to provide mothers and their children a means to survive when breadwinning fathers 
either died or abandoned their families.”). 
 42. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11. 
 43. MINK, supra note 41, at 1.  
 44. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401–405, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.). 
 47. Blank & Blum, supra note 36, at 29. 
 48. MINK, supra note 41, at 1.  
 49. The original ADC plan was written by the previous directors of the U.S. Children’s 
Bureau in the Department of Labor. The goal of these original drafters was to provide aid to all 
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breadwinner, with the idea that the mother should not be forced into 
paid work due to bad luck or tragedy. At the time, the overarching 
belief was that mothers belonged at home with their children.50 ADC’s 
designers believed that the program would be temporary for most 
families, and that once male breadwinners paid into Social Security—
a program created at about the same time as ADC—their widows 
would receive these benefits rather than welfare benefits and the 
program could slowly dissolve.51 
After Survivors Benefits were added to mainstream Social 
Security in 1939, there was a sense that the most “deserving” mothers 
(widows) were taken care of, leaving the second-class single mothers 
to the ADC caseload.52 In the early years of ADC, states had wide 
discretion to determine ADC eligibility, and they could, for example, 
decide that only children living in “suitable homes” would receive 
benefits.53 Some states used these requirements to exclude families 
deemed “undesirable,” such as black families or children of never-
married mothers.54 Indeed, by the 1950s, nineteen states had moved to 
deny eligibility to any child born to an unwed mother.55 Caseworkers 
had the power to investigate clients and cut off families they deemed 
undeserving for any number of reasons.56 Potential recipients were 
evaluated based on their child-rearing and housekeeping abilities and 
their children’s attendance at church and school.57 There was great 
variation by state regarding who was able to receive benefits and the 
 
children, with no restriction on how their household ended up without a breadwinner, and no 
restriction on the race of the families who received aid. Further, the program was originally 
designed to operate with the “highest social work standards,” providing mothers with personal 
casework in addition to cash stipends. The original crafters wanted to reduce any stigma 
associated with receiving help and to provide families headed only by a mother with guidance, 
since they believed those families were at risk. Linda Gordon & Felice Batlan, Aid to Dependent 
Children: The Legal History, SOC. WELFARE HIST. PROJECT: VCU LIBR. (2011), 
http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/public-welfare/aid-to-dependent-children-the-legal-history 
[https://perma.cc/LKU5-87VQ]. 
 50. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11; Blank & Blum, supra note 36, at 29–30. 
 51. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11. 
 52. See CHRISTOPHER SANDY JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, 
AND THE UNDERCLASS 2–3 (1992). 
 53. Blank & Blum, supra note 36, at 30. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Suzanne Mettler, Social Security Act of 1935, in 2 POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND POLICY 676, 683 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice 
O’Connor eds., 2004). 
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amount of the benefit they received.58 In states with large black 
populations, the cash benefits single mothers received were 
significantly less than in largely white states.59 
By 1962, the ADC caseload had grown from only a few hundred 
cases in the late 1930s to 3.6 million.60 In 1964, President Lyndon 
Johnson announced his “War on Poverty,” and called for increased 
federal oversight and programs aimed at overcoming poverty. 
Following President Johnson’s announcement, ADC rolls continued to 
expand and increase.61 
At the same time, however, other cultural, demographic, and 
policy shifts were taking place.62 An increasing number of women had 
entered the paid workforce during World War II, placing their children 
in childcare while they were away at work.63 The number of women in 
the paid workforce with children in childcare had continued to grow 
during the 1950s and 1960s, bringing about a larger cultural shift in 
beliefs about women, work, childcare, and whether the government 
should be in the business of helping mothers stay home with their 
children.64 These changes led to legislation at the federal level aimed at 
encouraging mothers to work, such as the Work Incentive Program 
established in 1967.65 However, funding for such programs was tight, 
and the programs were implemented only on a limited basis.66 
Also impacting mainstream perceptions of welfare was the 
increasing number of unmarried women having children. In 1960, 
about 5 percent of births were by unmarried women; by the 1970s this 
percentage doubled, and in the next decade, the number doubled 
again.67 Public commentary on this issue largely blamed welfare for this 
upward trend, reasoning that mothers were choosing to receive welfare 
 
 58. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 11. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 12–13.  
 62. See Blank & Blum, supra note 36, at 31. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 30. 
 65. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204, 81 Stat. 821, 884–92, amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a) (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(8), (19) (Supp. V. 1970)). Although enacted on 
Jan. 2, 1968, the Act is entitled the “Social Security Amendments of 1967.”  
 66. See Blank & Blum, supra note 36, at 31 (“[A]s would often be the case for federal 
welfare-to-work programs, limited resources permitted only partial translation of the mandate 
into practice.”).  
 67. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 15. 
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rather than choosing to have a husband.68 Even though no mainstream 
social science study supported this conclusion, welfare critics 
capitalized on this suggestion and sold it to the public.69 
President Ronald Reagan made welfare reform a major campaign 
issue when he began his campaign for the presidency in the mid-1970s. 
Reagan brought the infamous, though disproven, image of the welfare 
queen into the American consciousness. During a 1976 stump speech, 
Reagan described the welfare queen as follows: 
She has eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards 
and is collecting veterans’ benefits on four non-existing deceased 
husbands. And she’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got 
Medicaid, getting  food stamps and she is collecting welfare under 
each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over $150,000.70 
Welfare queens were also primarily portrayed as black (even 
though the majority of welfare recipients were white), and this image 
of welfare became embedded in the American consciousness through 
a combination of political speeches and media representations.71 When 
Reagan became President, he was not, ultimately, successful in making 
major changes to the welfare system, despite his calls for significant 
reform.72 However, his campaign against welfare was not lost, and it 
surfaced repeatedly before welfare was finally reformed in 1996.73 
By the 1990s, Bill Clinton, who had long been a proponent of 
changing the welfare system, once again made welfare reform a prime 
campaign issue. By the time he became President, there was bipartisan 
support for a work-based welfare program and little support for 
continuing welfare as an entitlement program.74 Senator Daniel 
Moynihan said, “Just as unemployment was the defining issue of 
industrialism, dependency is becoming the defining issue of post-
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. JULIET M. BRODIE, CLARE PASTORE, EZRA ROSSER & JEFFREY SELBIN, POVERTY 
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 89 (2014). 
 71. See EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 15; MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE 
WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 1–32 (2000) (detailing 
how the media contributed to the negative public perception of welfare). 
 72. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 17. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See MINK, supra note 41, at 2 (“Both parties championed wage work and marriage as 
alternatives to welfare. . . . Both parties equated welfare use with welfare abuse, justifying 
increasingly punitive ‘reforms.’”); see also Alstott, supra note 3, at 537–38 (noting widespread 
support for promoting work, rather than entitlement, for welfare programs). 
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industrial society.”75 Scholar and public intellectual Charles Murray 
proclaimed, “‘I know how’ to eliminate the problem of dependency: 
‘You just rip away every kind of government support there is.’”76 
Meanwhile, the press, which had helped publicize the image of the 
welfare queen,77 was reporting that “dependency” had reached 
“epidemic proportions.”78 
Indefinite entitlement programs such as welfare were deemed 
failures, and “personal responsibility” and “economic self-sufficiency” 
were key terms of the rhetoric surrounding federal antipoverty 
programs.79 Welfare was a prime topic of the 1992 presidential 
campaign, with both candidates arguing that they were the best 
candidate to do away with welfare and its perverse disincentives.80 
Clinton proposed a time limit to receive welfare: “[T]wo Years and Off 
to Work,” was one of his campaign slogans.81 
Ultimately, TANF imposed a strict five-year time limit on 
receiving aid, incentivized states to cut welfare rolls, and changed the 
way welfare was delivered.82 TANF funds are delivered to states in 
block grants, which are supposed to give states greater flexibility to 
 
 75. Jason DeParle, Washington Memo; In New Social Era, Moynihan Sees ‘New’ Social Ills, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/09/us/washington-memo-in-new-
social-era-moynihan-sees-new-social-ills.html [https://perma.cc/9WA5-CVYK].  
 76. FRANCES FOX PIVENS & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 397 (2d ed. 1993) (quoting David Whitman, Welfare:An 
Agenda for Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 5, 1992, at 38). 
 77. GILENS, supra note 71, at 1–32 (detailing how the media contributed to the negative 
public perception of welfare).  
 78. PIVENS & CLOWARD, supra note 76, at 397.  
 79. See Vicki Lens, Public Voices and Public Policy: Changing the Societal Discourse on 
“Welfare,” 39 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 137, 144–46 (2002) (discussing how political elites used 
morally charged language to frame the ideological debate on welfare reform); see also MINK, 
supra note 41, at 4 (discussing the view that poverty is a result of “moral failing”); Alstott, supra 
note 3, at 538–39 (“In the current political climate, then, work and responsibility are ‘in’ and 
traditional welfare is ‘out.’”).  
 80. See generally JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A 
NATION’S DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004) (discussing welfare as a campaign issue for all 
presidential candidates and detailing the lives of certain welfare recipients); Jason DeParle, The 
1992 Campaign: Issues—Welfare; Talk of Cutting Welfare Rolls Sounds Good, but Progress is Far 
From Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/17/us/1992-campaign-
issues-welfare-talk-cutting-welfare-rolls-sounds-good-but-progress.html?pagewanted=1 [https://
perma.cc/CY3V-HYQM] (explaining the specifics of the presidential candidates’ plans).  
 81. Frances Fox Piven, The Culture of Work Enforcement, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 93, 93–107 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenback & Patricia Smith eds., 2003). 
 82. An Introduction to TANF, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R8F-
ZSA2]. 
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help cash assistance recipients find and maintain work.83 Though the 
public conversation around TANF at the time of enactment focused on 
work, TANF allows states to spend welfare money on anything that 
falls under four broad goals: first, assisting needy families with children; 
second, promoting job preparation and work; third, preventing out-of-
wedlock pregnancies; and fourth, encouraging the formation of two-
parent families.84 
The change in the delivery method of welfare funds meant a 
tremendous change in the program that perhaps few predicted: rather 
than spending the bulk of their TANF funds on direct cash assistance 
to families or even work support for families, states instead spend most 
of the money on programs quite outside of these realms. Figure 1, 
below, details the average state distribution of TANF funds in 2015. As 
the Figure shows, even though the key stated goals of welfare reform 
were to provide a temporary safety net to families and to prepare 
recipients for work, states spent only half of their TANF funds on core 
welfare reform areas such as basic cash assistance, work-related 
activities and supports, and child care. Twelve states spent less than 30 
percent of their TANF funds on such core activities.85 
Prior to welfare reform, basic assistance was the single largest use 
of federal and state AFDC funds.86 By 2014, only 25 percent of TANF 
funds went to direct cash assistance, which was the core of the former 
AFDC welfare program. Seven states spent less than 10 percent of 
TANF funds on direct cash assistance to families in need.87 Further, the 
numbers related to helping recipients find work, the heart of welfare 
reform, are notable—only 10 percent of TANF funds were used for 
work-related activities.88 Most states do not direct significant money to 
job training programs. In fact, the federal government offers additional 
funding to states that pledge to provide job training or workforce slots 
for every person facing the welfare time limit. However, only five states 
 
 83. Chart Book: TANF at 20, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/chart-book-tanf-at-20 [https://perma.cc/
77H3-6DG2].  
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2012). 
 85. Liz Schott & Ife Floyd, How States Use Funds Under the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 7–9 (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/1-5-17tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8D7-UUGL]. 
 86. Liz Schott, LaDonna Pavetti & Ife Floyd, How States Use Federal and State Funds Under 
the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 5 (Oct. 15, 2015), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-8-15tanf_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH4V-SQ2R].  
 87. Id. at 2.  
 88. Schott & Floyd, supra note 85, at 7–9. 
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have taken the pledge.89 
Instead of using TANF funds to further the key stated goals of 
welfare reform, states spent almost a third of their 2015 TANF funds 
on services such as child welfare, which includes the organizations that 
run the foster care system and charge parents with child abuse and 
neglect; early education; afterschool programs; and college financial 
aid, in some cases for women who do not have children.90 It is hard to 
argue that, for example, the child welfare system somehow promotes 
job readiness—it is an often-punishing system for poor parents that can 
actually result in parents losing their jobs when their names appear on 
child abuse registries.91 These shifts in spending have meant a 
fundamental change for families who qualify for welfare. Post-reform, 
families are forced to find an alternative safety net. 
 
 89. Delphine D’Amora, Welfare Reform Is 20 Years Old and It’s Worse Than You Can 
Imagine, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 22, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/
08/welfare-reform-20-years-old-and-its-worse-you-can-imagine [https://perma.cc/NK2Z-8PTF].  
 90. Schott & Floyd, supra note 85, at 2.  
 91. Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?, NATION (Sept. 30, 
2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gone-too-far [https:// 
perma.cc/LGL7-RZW4] (describing a story of a woman who lost her job after being cited with 
inadequate supervision when her son ran into the street with his scooter during a fight over it with 
his cousin). 
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Figure 1.92 
B. Where Are They Now? 
If the goal was to reduce the number of families on the welfare 
rolls, welfare reform was wildly successful. On the eve of welfare 
reform, roughly seven in ten poor families received welfare. Now, only 
about two in ten do so.93 Over the last roughly twenty years, TANF 
rolls are down to about 2.7 million total recipients including children,94 
which is an 81 percent decline from 1994.95 
President Clinton and House Republicans were encouraged by the 
drop in welfare rolls and a steady increase in the number of low-income 
 
 92. The data for Figure 1 were collected by the Department of Health and Human Services 
and presented graphically by Liz Schott and Ife Floyd in Schott & Floyd, supra note 85. Figure 1 
is a slightly modified recreation of Schott and Floyd’s graph.  
 93. Kathryn Edin & H. Luke Shaefer, 20 Years Since Welfare ‘Reform,’ ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/20-years-welfare-reform/496730 
[https://perma.cc/MBW4-SKXA]. 
 94. TANF Caseload Data 2016, OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data-2016 [https://perma.cc/7SUT-GLDG].  
 95. Caseload Data 1994 (AFDC Total), OFF. FAM. ASSISTANCE (Dec. 19, 2004), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/caseload-data-afdc-1994-total [https://perma.cc/78TB-EZ6Y]. 
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single mothers who worked.96 A year after he signed the welfare reform 
bill, Clinton told an audience, “[I]t’s fair to say the debate is over—we 
now know that welfare reform works.”97 In 2006, ten years later, 
Clinton wrote an op-ed for the New York Times entitled How We 
Ended Welfare, Together.98 In this op-ed, after describing encouraging 
statistics about the drop in welfare rolls and simultaneous increase in 
employment of women who had left welfare, Clinton declared 
“[w]elfare reform has proved a great success.”99 
Welfare as we knew it did end. However, poverty as we knew it 
did not. The poverty rate for children in 2015 was 19.7 percent.100 
Roughly four out of every ten children in the United States, 38.8 
percent, are poor for at least one year before they reach their 
eighteenth birthday, and for black children, 75.4 percent are poor for 
at least one year of their childhood. Additionally, 10.5 percent of all 
children and 38.5 percent of black children are poor for at least half of 
their childhoods.101 
Despite these numbers, initial results for welfare reform did look 
promising, as Clinton suggested. In 1993, 58 percent of low-income 
single mothers were employed, and this number rose to almost 75 
percent by 2000.102 At the time welfare reform hit, the economy was 
booming and jobs were more readily available than in the 2000s, when 
the Great Recession hit and rates of employment for mothers dropped 
significantly.103 Even before the Great Recession, there were two 
primary groups of welfare mothers: those who worked and those who 
were neither receiving welfare nor working. One in five single mothers 
did not work during the mid-2000s.104 For many years, this group of 
mothers fell under the radar, but a recent study has shed much light on 
those in deep poverty—living on roughly $2 per day.105 This Article, 
 
 96. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
 97. Clyde Haberman, 20 Years Later, Welfare Overhaul Resonates for Families and 
Candidates, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/us/20-years-later-
welfare-overhaul-resonates-for-families-and-candidates.html [https://perma.cc/JGU4-UBLM]. 
 98. Bill Clinton, Opinion, How We Ended Welfare, Together, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at 
A19.  
 99. Id.  
 100. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, JESSICA L. SEMEGA & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 12 (2016).  
 101. Id.  
 102. EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 30.  
 105. Id.  
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however, focuses on another group of mothers—those who have been 
able to obtain a job that pays above the poverty line at some point post-
welfare reform, but who have also experienced financial troubles at 
some point along the way. For this group of mothers, income volatility 
is commonplace, and small shocks that derail years of hard work are 
the norm.106 
II.  THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT 
Just as welfare reform took effect in the mid-1990s, credit scores 
and reports were gaining increased importance as gatekeepers to some 
of the most important economic institutions in the American economy. 
The history of credit reporting is often neglected, but it is key to 
understanding why some of the current proposals to regulate the use 
of credit reports may fall short. After briefly discussing the history of 
credit scores and reports, this Part provides a short primer on the 
mechanics of credit reports and scores, and then takes a detailed look 
at the expanding importance of credit in providing access to 
mainstream economic institutions. Finally, this Part discusses the role 
of credit in the lives of low-income families in a post-welfare-reform 
era. 
A. The Surprising History of Credit Reports and Scores 
Civil rights groups in the twenty-first century have advocated for 
curbing the use of credit reports in hiring and other contexts.107 In the 
 
 106. Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 395, 397 (2003) (“[L]ow-income families experience higher income volatility from year to 
year than middle- and high-income families . . . .”); Greene, supra note 15, at 518 (“While 
insecurity has increased for all Americans, levels of insecurity are higher among those with low 
incomes . . . and single parents.”); Jacob S. Hacker et al., Economic Insecurity and the Great 
Recession: Findings from the Economic Security Index, ECON. SECURITY INDEX 16–17 (Nov. 
2011), http://economicsecurityindex.org/assets/ESI%20Full%20Report%202011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6JHB-LN7J]; Jacob S. Hacker et al., Econ. Security Index, Economic Security at Risk: 
Findings from the Economic Security Index, ECON. SECURITY INDEX, at iv (July 2010), 
http://economicsecurityindex.org/upload/media/Economic_Security_Index_Full_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XMM-NM4W] (noting that the amount of insecurity varies across the 
population and that the less affluent face the most insecurity). 
 107. In 2009, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law issued a letter in support 
of the Equal Employment for All Act, which would ban employers from seeking credit reports as 
a screening tool in most hiring contexts. The letter was joined by thirteen other groups, including 
the Asian American Justice Center; Communications Workers of America; AFL-CIO; 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights; International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America; NAACP; NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund; National Community Reinvestment Coalition; National Council of La Raza; 
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mid-twentieth century, however, civil rights and women’s rights groups 
were behind the push to mandate uniform standards of credit.108 The 
history of credit in the United States helps to explain why. 
Credit has long been tied to a promise to repay, and timely 
repayment is considered a sign of trustworthiness.109 Long before credit 
bureaus existed, lenders relied on a potential borrower’s personal 
reputation within a community to decide whether or not to trust the 
individual with money.110 In the early twentieth century, consumer 
financing of goods became increasingly popular, and families who once 
would have been ashamed to use consumer credit instead came to 
believe that buying items on credit was financially savvy.111 Indeed, by 
the late 1920s, most durable goods were bought on installment plans: 
65 to 70 percent of automobiles, over 70 percent of furniture, and 80 
percent of household appliances.112 
Credit and loan-making decisions during this time were almost 
entirely subjective. As credit expanded, department stores established 
specialized credit offices that were charged with managing credit 
applications in a systematic and ordered fashion. Applicants were 
“interviewed, and assessments of their creditworthiness were made on 
the basis of the perceived physical demeanor of the applicant—how 
‘shifty,’ ‘evasive,’ ‘seedy,’ or ‘flashy’ they looked.”113 Credit analysts 
followed their own judgments when deciding whether to grant or deny 
 
National Employment Lawyers Association; National Fair Housing Alliance; National 
Partnership for Women and Families; National Women’s Law Center; and Women Employed. 
Letter from the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law to Congressman Steve Cohen 
(July 17, 2009), http://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Equal-Employment-
for-All-Support-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/76Y6-9MLM]. 
 108. See generally LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION (2011) (discussing the role of the 
NAACP and other groups in pressuring the Federal Housing Administration to curb their 
discriminatory mortgage practices); see also Louis Hyman, Ending Discrimination, Legitimating 
Debt: The Political Economy of Race, Gender, and Credit Access in the 1960s and 1970s, 12 
ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y. 200, 202 (2011) (describing the role of activists in negotiating a series of 
laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s intended to promote credit fairness for all Americans). 
 109. See, e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers & Jeong-Chul Kim, The Sociology of Finance, 37 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 239, 240–41 (2011).  
 110. Bruce Carruthers & Wendy Espeland, Money, Meaning, and Morality, 41 AM. BEHAV. 
SCI. 1384, 1393 (1998) (describing how, throughout history, lenders used personal characteristics 
and reputations of borrowers in order to decide whether to loan the potential borrower money).  
 111. See generally Martha L. Olney, Spendthrift, or Sophisticated Borrower? (Nov. 14, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the increasing use of 
consumer credit in the early twentieth century). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Donncha Marron, “Lending by Numbers”: Credit Scoring and the Constitution of Risk 
Within American Consumer Credit, 36 ECON. & SOC’Y. 103, 106 (2007).  
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requests, and discrimination based on age, sex, marital status, social 
class, and ethnicity was rampant, making traditional credit unavailable 
to many.114 
During the 1930s and beyond, the availability of credit continued 
to expand for most Americans, but poor and minority communities 
were explicitly excluded from access to low-cost government and other 
mainstream loans.115 The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
used an explicitly discriminatory rating system and “residential security 
maps” to label black communities as “high risk.”116 These practices 
were continued into the 1950s and 1960s by the Federal Housing 
Authority, the Veterans Administration, banks, real estate agents, 
appraisers, and others.117 After World War II, the growth of credit 
markets for middle-class white Americans exploded—availability went 
well beyond the installment department store credit of the 1920s.118 
Credit was interwoven into the everyday fabric of life—homes, cars, 
even clothing was financed. Credit access was the road to the American 
Dream. 
Poor and minority Americans, however, were relegated to fringe 
lending and paid much more than they would have otherwise.119 
Retailers in poor, mostly minority neighborhoods kept their accounts 
in leather-bound books (a relic of the past), going door-to-door to 
collect on debts, unlike suburban retailers.120 The prices were much 
higher in these poor neighborhoods, too. The same exact model of 
General Electric dryer that cost $238 in more affluent areas cost $270 
in poorer areas of Washington, D.C.121 Particularly after World War II, 
installment credit gave way to revolving credit for durable goods for 
most of America,122 but in poor neighborhoods, installment credit was 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. Lisa Rice & Deidre Swensik, Discriminatory Effects of Credit Scoring on Communities 
of Color, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 935, 936 (2013).  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. HYMAN, supra note 108, at 135–37 (describing the prevalence of different types of credit 
for white middle-class Americans in the Postwar suburbs). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Hyman, supra note 108, at 201.  
 121. Id. at 205.  
 122. Revolving credit is credit that does not have a specific number of payments attached to 
it and is usually used on an as-needed basis. Credit cards and home-equity loans tend to be 
revolving lines of credit. Installment credit is credit that has a specific, finite number of payments 
attached to it. It often comes in the form of a loan that is paid back in set increments for a set 
number of months.  
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the only way of life, with high interest rates and one-sided terms.123 
There was no access to credit cards in these poor neighborhoods and 
only extremely limited access to mortgages that would allow for 
mobility.124 Black residents knew they need not apply—even in the 
early 1970s, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report about the 
practices of a major consumer finance company found that applicants’ 
race was noted and given point scores on every application. White 
borrowers got seven points, a “person of Spanish origin” four points, 
and a black borrower no points at all.125 
It was in this context that advocates for disadvantaged groups 
argued that instead of relying on one loan officer’s individual judgment 
and biases, universal automated systems would decrease the potential 
for discrimination because they would be “transparent, consistent, 
uniform, unbiased, less labor intensive and automatable.”126 As credit 
historian Louis Hyman wrote, advocates believed the key to 
eliminating discrimination was in “increasing automation of decision 
making, in moving credit evaluation out of the hands of discriminatory 
loan officers and into the algorithms of objective quantitative credit 
lending models.”127 Both civil rights groups and women’s rights groups 
got involved. For example, the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) issued a press release that called on “Congress [to] amend the 
fair credit reporting act to require such [credit bureau] agencies to 
maintain individual files on all consumers without regard to sex or 
marital status.”128 
Congress eventually responded, and beginning in 1974, it passed 
legislation and a series of targeted amendments that sought to end 
discrimination in credit evaluations and lending. When President 
Gerald Ford signed the amendment that targeted racial discrimination, 
he noted the shared commitment of Congress and his administration 
to “achieve goals of fairness and equality in a broad range of business 
transactions [which] millions of American consumers engage in every 
day of every year.”129 
By the late 1970s, creditors were committed to eliminating any 
 
 123. Hyman, supra note 108, at 205. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 224.  
 126. Marron, supra note 113, at 113.  
 127. Hyman, supra note 108, at 223–24. 
 128. Id. at 225.  
 129. Id. at 226.  
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possibility of a lawsuit, and thus many of them completely eliminated 
the role of loan officers in evaluating applicants and accelerated the 
transition to computer-based credit models.130 Richard Cremer, a 
credit executive at Montgomery Ward, said that “traditional credit 
manager[s] . . . emphasized [their] face-to-face contact with the credit 
applicant,”131 which clouded judgment. “Biases, prejudices, and even 
mood” could affect the loan officers’ evaluations—and ultimately hurt 
profits.132 Thus, Cremer reasoned, credit scoring “encourage[d] a 
decision motivated by economics alone” and was the “only available 
method that meets the criterion of fairness.”133 Explicitly 
discriminatory categories were removed from models’ variables, and 
thus, the computer models and reports allegedly eliminated human 
prejudice and replaced it with consistent and “fair” reports that were 
no longer subject to the whims of individual loan officers.134 
Today, FICO scores, which are derived from credit reports and 
range from 300 to 850, are the basis for most credit scores.135 FICO was 
founded in 1956 as Fair, Isaac and Company by the engineer William 
Fair and the mathematician Earl Isaac.136 The two worked together to 
devise a model to evaluate the risk that an individual would default on 
a loan, based only on a borrower’s finances. Thus, the score was to be 
race, sex, and even socioeconomic-status neutral.137 FICO went public 
in 1986, the first general-purpose FICO score was released in 1989, and 
mortgage companies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using 
FICO scores to help determine mortgage qualification in 1995.138 
Currently, the three main credit-reporting agencies use FICO scores as 
a basis for their credit score models.139 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 226–27.  
 135. Our History, FICO, http://www.fico.com/en/about-us#our_history [https://perma.cc/
6XDG-7HFA]. 
 136. Id.  
 137. O’NEIL, supra note 22, at 142.  
 138. Our History, supra note 135. 
 139. See The Impact of Differences Between Consumer- and Creditor-Purchased Credit Scores, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 5–6 (July 19, 2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_20110719_CreditScores.pdf [https://perma.cc/M73D-
9Z9E].  
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B. A Brief Primer on Current Credit Report and Score Mechanics 
FICO scores analyze information collected from credit reporting 
agencies in order to predict likely outcomes for lending money. FICO 
scores take five main factors into consideration. First, payment history, 
which considers whether bills were paid on time, accounts for roughly 
35 percent of FICO a score. Second, credit utilization, which refers to 
the amount of credit a person is using compared to the amount of 
available credit the person has, accounts for about 30 percent of a 
FICO score. Third, the age of credit accounts makes up roughly 15 
percent of a FICO score, with longer histories of on-time payments 
rewarded. Fourth, recent credit inquiries, which take into account 
when and how many credit inquiries were made, makes up about 10 
percent of a FICO score. It is theorized that recent credit inquiries are 
a relevant factor because someone who has a lot of recent inquiries is 
more likely to be in a financial hole and in need of credit, making the 
person a more risky debtor. Finally, the types of credit a person has 
determine the remaining 10 percent of a FICO score: FICO scores are 
helped when a debtor has a variety of credit, including a mix of 
borrowing and repayment.140 Simultaneously having a student loan, a 
credit card, and a mortgage payment, for example, would generally 
help a person’s credit score, while having just one credit card or just 
one student loan can bring a score down.141 
There are three main credit reporting bureaus: TransUnion, 
Experian, and Equifax.142 All three of these separate bureaus report 
roughly the same information, with some variation. Each bureau will 
report a slightly different score because each bureau uses a slightly 
different model for its calculations.143 
Credit reports are distinct from credit scores. They are complex 
documents, often many pages long.144 They contain basic credit card 
history—cards opened, cards closed, payment history, etc.—as well as 
 
 140. What’s in My FICO Scores, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/credit-education/whats-in-
your-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/Y2B9-FWZG]. 
 141. Id.  
 142. See, e.g., Analysis of Differences Between Consumer- and Creditor-Purchased Credit 
Scores, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 4 (Sept. 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201209_Analysis_Differences_Consumer_Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ33-6Z5N]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Barbara Kiviat, Capability, Character, Credential: The Multiple Meanings-and 
Consequences-of Credit Reports in Hiring 5 (Apr. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
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payment history on mortgages, car loans, and student loans.145 There 
are certain types of delinquencies—such as overdue utility bills, unpaid 
medical expenses, and owed rent—that show up on a credit report only 
if they are reported to a debt collector. Positive payment histories in 
these three areas are not included on a credit report.146 
Ultimately, the basic functions of credit reporting and scores 
described in this Section form the basis for inclusion in, and exclusion 
from, important economic resources, as described below. 
C. Credit Histories as Gatekeepers 
On the surface, modern credit scoring appears to be an impartial 
and fair system for evaluating consumer risk. However, there is an 
important and growing literature that articulates why the current 
system may continue to harm disadvantaged groups by potentially 
replacing explicit discrimination with implicit discrimination. Some 
have described the potential for algorithms used in systems such as 
credit scoring to be inherently biased and thus cause disparate impacts 
on certain groups, despite all appearances of impartiality.147 While not 
the focus of this Article, these concerns are important when 
 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, 
OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 11 (2016) (noting that about 30 percent of consumers in low-
income neighborhoods are credit invisible, meaning they do not have enough credit history to 
have a credit score, and thus are ineligible for credit that requires a credit score). This same report 
also argues that big data can lead to discriminatory results based on poorly selected data, 
incomplete, incorrect, or outdated data, selection bias, and unintentional perpetuation and 
promotion of historical biases. Id. at 7–8. Scholars have aired nearly identical concerns. See, e.g., 
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 671, 
679 (2016) (discussing the potential of big data to deny historically disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups full participation in society because the data algorithms use are frequently imperfect in 
ways that allows algorithms to inherit the prejudices of prior decision makers); id. at 679 (noting 
that, in regards to credit scores, “there is no way to directly measure creditworthiness because the 
very notion of creditworthiness is a function of the particular way the credit industry has 
constructed the credit issuing and repayment system”); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, 
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) 
(arguing that though automated systems are designed to avoid discrimination by rating people in 
the same way, this is misleading because “human beings program predictive algorithms, [and] 
their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the source code 
and predictive algorithms,” and thus, that the scoring process can prove discriminatory, have a 
disparate impact, and even allow for “systemizing” discrimination); Rice & Swensik, supra note 
115, at 937 (arguing that credit scoring systems used today rely upon the dual credit market that 
discriminates, and has historically discriminated, against people of color). See generally Tal Z. 
Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH . L. REV. 1375 (2014) 
(describing discrimination-based concerns that result from big data).  
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considering just how expansive the use of credit histories has become. 
In the case of employment decisions, employers do not even have 
a potentially objective measure such as a credit score on which to judge 
potential employees. Employers are not given access to credit scores;148 
instead, employers are given credit reports—complicated documents 
with multiple data points—and then are left to interpret these data 
points themselves. As discussed previously, credit reports include an 
individual’s personal information, including their name, address, 
previous address, social security number, and information about credit 
card accounts, including balances, credit limits, monthly payments, and 
tardy payments; mortgage debt and payment history; bankruptcy 
records; judgments in civil actions; data on student loans; amounts of 
car payments; bills that are in collection, including medical debts; tax 
liens; and inquiries regarding credit status.149 Little is known about 
exactly how employers interpret credit reports and the information 
contained in them,150 but a survey by the Society of Human Resources 
found that almost half of their member employers do consider credit 
reports in hiring decisions.151 It would not be hard to surmise that some 
amount of implicit or explicit bias goes into how employers interpret 
credit reports and the vast amount of data contained in them. 
Employment is just one of many new domains where the credit 
report or score is a factor in gaining access. A study by TransUnion 
found that almost half of all landlords surveyed performed a credit 
check as part of their leasing process.152 In the case of landlords, they 
are provided with credit scores as well as full credit reports. Of those 
landlords in the TransUnion study who performed a credit check, 
almost half reported that it was among the top three factors used when 
 
 148. See Leslie Callaway & Mark Kruhm, Servicemember Disclosure a Must on All Mortgages, 
102 AM. BANKERS ASS’N BANKING J. 64, 64 (2010) (“Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion all 
decline to provide credit scores to employers for employment screening.”).  
 149. FED. RESERVE BULLETIN, AN OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER DATA AND CREDIT 
REPORTING 47 (Feb. 2003); Traub, supra note 23, at 1.  
 150. I am currently in the early stages of surveying and interviewing employers to learn how 
they interpret credit reports and what, if any, formal policies or trainings are in place in larger 
companies to teach people who make hiring decisions how to interpret and factor in credit reports.  
 151. SHRM Survey Findings: Background Checking–The Use of Credit Background Checks 
in Hiring Decisions, supra note 22. 
 152. TransUnion Reveals Almost Half of Landlords Consider Renters’ Credit Health as a Key 
Factor in Leasing Decision, TRANSUNION (May 12, 2014), http://newsroom.transunion.com/
transunion-reveals-almost-half-of-landlords-consider-renters-credit-health-as-a-key-factor-in-
leasing-decision [https://perma.cc/LW4Q-9HRJ]. 
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deciding whether to accept a tenant’s lease application.153 Additionally, 
over 92 percent of car insurance companies conduct credit checks and 
set rates based on credit history.154 For families whose providers need 
a car in order to get to work, a prohibitively high rate can be disastrous. 
Even utility companies have begun conducting credit checks, and 
requiring those with low scores to either provide significant “deposits” 
before the utility is hooked up, or to get a guarantee-to-pay letter from 
someone else.155 For many poor families living paycheck to paycheck, 
this security deposit is prohibitive.156 
D. Credit as a Safety Net 
At the same time that credit scores and reports are becoming 
increasingly important gatekeepers to economic resources, the use of 
credit—and thus the accumulation of debt—has seen a significant 
increase among low-income parents. This increase is due both to 
deregulation of the lending industry that allowed lenders to engage in 
higher-risk consumer lending157 and to the necessity of a private safety 
net for low-income families post-welfare reform. Several studies have 
found that, post-welfare reform, low-income parents increasingly rely 
on credit to weather emergencies.158 The reasons are multidimensional. 
For one, credit cards provide “a fast, easy, stigma-free” way of coping 
with most financial emergencies.159 Credit cards are particularly useful 
 
 153. Id.  
 154. Geico’s Credit Use–Frequently Asked Questions, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/ 
information/credit-use-faq [https://perma.cc/G2DE-SX6R]. 
 155. FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY SERVICES (2012), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/ 
articles/0220-utility-services [https://perma.cc/MG79-FGND]. 
 156. For a detailed account of a family struggling because of the need to provide a down 
payment or guarantor for an electricity hook-up, see infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 158. See Greene, supra note 15, at 549; Littwin, supra note 16, at 457–58; Mann, supra note 
20, at 257–58. 
 159. Littwin, supra note 16, at 458; see also RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE 
GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 63 (2006) (“[D]ata suggest that 
many families use credit cards to meet crisis-level medical expenses, and the special features of 
credit card borrowing might have eased the difficulty. . . . [T]he credit card can be the lifeline by 
which the families pull themselves out of distress.” (citations omitted) (citing Adam J. Levitin, 
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 69 (2006); then citing Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and 
Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (1998))); Kevin T. Leicht, Borrowing to the Brink: 
Consumer Debt in America, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 
17, at 195, 205 (“Credit card debt is a particularly useful substitute for wages because it can be 
used to meet everyday or large-ticket expenses.”); Mann, supra note 20, at 257–58 (“The credit 
card also provides a remarkably flexible safety net that can be deployed in response to unexpected 
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for emergencies that require immediate action. Further, family and 
friend networks are generally less reliable than credit cards because 
networks of low-income workers tend to be low-income themselves, 
and thus are often resource deprived.160 Studies also indicate that 
people sometimes hesitate to ask family and friends for help during an 
emergency because it means admitting to the family member or friend 
that one is in need and cannot provide for oneself, resulting in feelings 
of shame and embarrassment.161 Relatedly, people sometimes feel 
guilty asking to borrow money because they know that borrowing the 
money would cause a financial strain on their network member.162 
Credit cards, on the other hand, do not come with these problems. 
But when families are struggling financially and are in need of a 
safety net, how do they make decisions about whether to try to access 
public benefits, to utilize credit, and to enlist tools to relieve debt? How 
might these decisions be related to the culture of welfare reform, and 
how might these decisions affect the long-term trajectory of a family’s 
financial stability, and poverty and inequality more generally? The 
next Part turns to these questions. 
III.  PERVERSE DISINCENTIVES AND DOWNWARD MOBILITY: THE 
ACCIDENTAL INTERACTION OF CREDIT HISTORIES AND SELF-
SUFFICIENCY 
This Part uses real-world illustrations from qualitative data to 
explain how the current safety net for financially struggling families is 
flawed. From a public policy standpoint, the safety net is ineffective 
because it does not adequately enable low-income families to become 
self-sufficient. From an equity standpoint, it is likewise ineffective 
because it does not provide enough tools to reduce inequality and 
poverty. 
The first Section of this Part briefly describes the data I collected 
through interviews with families who have struggled financially. The 
second Section utilizes the sociological concept of narratives to show 
how the current safety net punishes families who have embraced the 
self-sufficiency narrative by using credit, rather than public assistance, 
as a safety net. The third Section describes how, ironically, those who 
attempt to repair their debt and credit history through privately 
 
financial crises.”).  
 160. Littwin, supra note 16, at 460. 
 161. See Greene, supra note 15, at 549. 
 162. See id.  
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advertised forms of repair ultimately may experience more downward 
mobility than those who seek out public forms of support such as 
bankruptcy. This is just one example of the perverse incentives 
inherent in the current safety net: those who have internalized the self-
sufficiency narrative may end up worse off than those who are inclined 
to seek help from public programs. 
The fourth Section shows how families who have resisted a self-
sufficiency narrative—and have instead embraced what this Article 
calls “deserving recipient” narratives—are often rewarded by the 
current safety net system. Though these narratives are counter to the 
self-sufficiency narrative welfare reformers might hope for, they 
sometimes protect these respondents from the pitfalls of the punishing 
credit system. The illustrations in this Section ultimately lead to an 
imagining of a new program for the safety net that could better serve 
the needs of vulnerable families, which is highlighted in Part V. 
A. Data 
The data utilized in this study were collected in 2016 and 2017. I 
conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews with seventy-one 
parents in North Carolina who self-identified as having earned at least 
$3000 in gross monthly income for six months or more in the past two 
years, having struggled to pay a bill at some point in the past two years, 
and having at least one minor child.163 
The study’s initial purposes were to better understand how parents 
who had struggled financially experienced and understood credit, 
credit reports, and credit scores, and to investigate the role of credit as 
a safety net more generally. I recruited families from two sources: local 
online school and parent resource groups and Legal Aid of North 
 
 163. Since I was particularly interested in the role of credit as it related to financial volatility 
of families with children, my goal was to interview parents who had struggled financially in the 
past two years, but who had also earned income well above the federal poverty line for at least a 
few months in the past two years. In 2016, a family of four who earned $36,375 was earning 150 
percent of the federal poverty line. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2016 Federal Poverty 
Level Chart, https://www.parkviewmc.com/app/files/public/1484/2016-Poverty-Level-Chart.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KX57-QGAH]. Monthly, such a family would earn $3,031. I rounded to $3,000 
for ease and clarity. There was of course variation in the number of children each family had, and 
whether there was a second adult earner in the household, but the purpose of the study was not 
to create a strict sample based on income. Instead, the focus of the study was on how families with 
at least one parent who had worked at a job that paid well, relative to the poverty line, coped with 
financial emergencies. Thus, I conducted interviews with parents who had earned well above the 
federal poverty line (over $3,000 in a given month) at some point in time during the last two years 
(for at least 6 months), but who also had, despite these earnings, struggled to pay a bill in the past 
two years.  
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Carolina webinars, which contained a slide advertising this study. Once 
a family contacted me expressing interest in being part of the study, I 
conducted a screening call over the phone to ensure the family 
qualified for the study before conducting a full interview in-person. All 
but ten of the interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes. 
The other ten interviews were conducted in alternate private and 
semiprivate spaces chosen to ensure the respondents felt comfortable 
discussing intimate aspects of their finances and personal lives. Each 
respondent received $40.00 for an approximately two-hour-long 
interview. At the beginning of each interview, respondents signed a 
consent form that, among other things, summarized the study and 
potential risks and benefits to the respondent, detailed the 
confidentiality measures taken to protect respondent identity, and 
allowed the interview to be recorded.164 
The data are not meant to be representative, as I am not making 
quantitative claims about the commonality of the varying outcomes for 
families.165 We already know that the credit reporting system works 
such that those who borrow money they cannot pay back are penalized 
on their credit reports and scores. Qualitative data are not needed to 
verify this point—it is the mechanics of how credit scoring and 
reporting work. The contribution of the qualitative data, however, is to 
illustrate how existing functions of the credit system can interact with 
varying cultural adoptions of self-sufficiency and personal 
responsibility to create perverse incentives for financially struggling 
families similar to those welfare reformers were trying to combat. The 
data also illustrate how the existing safety net for financially struggling 
families does little to allow for independent financial resilience, 
another goal of welfare reformers and a goal many respondents 
articulated as important for themselves. 
Indeed, in-depth interviews are particularly useful when 
 
 164. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Duke University. 
In line with the requirements of the IRB and the confidentiality agreement that respondents 
signed, I made every effort to protect the identity of respondents. At the stage of initial contact, 
each respondent was assigned a unique identification number, which was included on their 
transcripts and data file. A name (not associated with the respondent’s actual name) was assigned 
to each unique code number to ease data presentation and eliminate potential confusion. I 
omitted potentially identifying information from all data presentation, such as exact addresses 
and exact places of employment. I also replaced actual names of family and friends with alternate 
names.  
 165. For more information about qualitative research methodology and sampling, see Mario 
Luis Small, ‘How Many Cases Do I Need?’: On Science and the Logic of Case Selection in Field-
Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5, 24–27 (2009), and Lamont & White, supra note 30, at 10. 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
266  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:233 
researchers are attempting to understand “the experience[s] of 
individuals within social contexts”166 and to include subjective 
experiences.167 In-depth interviews enable researchers to gather data 
about “the cultural understandings actors bring to social experience, 
interactions, and institutions.”168 The aim of the study and sampling 
strategy is to illuminate and understand rather than to predict or 
determine causation.169 This is the dominant strategy used among 
analytical sociologists.170 
In qualitative analysis, presentation of exact numbers can lead to 
a false sense of precision of the data.171 Further, these percentages do 
not take into account the strength of people’s statements. Thus, in 
general, I refrained from reporting exact percentages or proportions of 
respondents because of the limitations and potential for 
misunderstanding such presentation of qualitative data can promote. 
Accordingly, this Article primarily uses adjectives such as “most,” 
“many,” and “some” to convey the prevalence of a theme across 
interviews, rather than reporting exact percentages of prevalence.172 
This Article uses the word “most” when the vast majority of 
respondents in a given group indicated a specific viewpoint or theme. 
The word “many” is used when roughly half of the group in question 
referred to a position or theme, and the word “some” when a theme or 
idea was not representative of a group as a whole but was shared by 
several people and thus suggested a potentially important pattern. All 
findings presented in this Article were supported by multiple 
respondents, and no outlier viewpoints are presented, unless indicated 
as such. 
 
 166. Lamont & White, supra note 30, at 10. 
 167. Id. (“Qualitative approaches allow for the inclusion of subjective experience and cultural 
sense making that play a vital role in understanding all facets of social life.”). 
 168. Id.  
 169. JULIET CORBIN & ANSELM STRAUSS, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: 
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY 48, 159–60 (3d ed. 
2008).  
 170. See Mario Luis Small, Causal Thinking and Ethnographic Research, 119 AM. J. SOC. 597, 
599 (2013).  
 171. See SUSAN STURM & KINGA MAKOVI, FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 30 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/files/FullParticipationintheYaleLawJournal 
_e929dpx1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT9F-R9BM].  
 172. For another example of this reporting technique for qualitative data, see id. 
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B. Broken Bootstraps: When Self-Sufficiency Fails 
When Latisha Jones173 was in her 20s, she lived on welfare, which 
was AFDC at that time. Between AFDC and a few side jobs,174 she had 
just enough money for the necessities for herself and her son. Now in 
her mid-forties, twenty years after welfare reform, Latisha is struggling. 
She is over $10,000 in debt, a consequence of using credit to get by 
during tough economic times. She is currently without a job—she said 
she had a “good” one, but her employer downsized—and she is using 
the little credit she has available to keep afloat. 
Latisha’s days consist of searching for a job, but, as she said, “it’s 
just not coming.” She was brought in for two different job interviews, 
but one employer told her she did not get the position because of her 
“troubling” credit report, and the other never got back to her. With no 
job in sight, Latisha tried to move to a less expensive apartment, but 
her application was denied because her credit “did not check out.” As 
Latisha put it, “That freaking score . . . I can’t win with it. I need to fix 
it. It needs to be better. Find a way, God lead me to find a way. You 
see that Charlie and the Chocolate movie? Well, a good score, well, it’s 
my very own golden ticket.” 
The irony of Latisha’s situation is that, despite her failure to 
improve her credit history, she is in some regards a poster child for 
welfare reform. When she talks about her time on welfare, she says she 
“hated it because [she] was needing a handout.” She makes sure to 
distinguish herself from “those lazies who sat around getting fat, eating 
Doritos . . . I was stuck because my son had bad, bad asthma and was 
always home sick.” During our interview, she said, “I take care of 
myself. I teach my boy that too. You gotta figure things out for yourself. 
Don’t be asking for a handout. It’s about Jesus. You give not take.” 
This is exactly the “self-sufficient” rhetoric that bipartisan welfare 
reformers hoped for. Indeed, when Latisha was asked whether she had 
sought help from welfare given her trouble finding a job, she replied, 
“No way no how. I’m done with that. I said no more handouts.” 
Latisha’s resistance to seeking out cash welfare through TANF, 
 
 173. All names of respondents are pseudonyms. 
 174. Many women who received AFDC took on unreported side jobs such as housecleaning 
and caring for other people’s children in order to have enough income for necessities. See EDIN 
& LEIN, supra note 3, at 172, 174 (“The urban economies of all four sites provided various forms 
of unreported work in the informal economy, such as housecleaning, babysitting, laundry, yard 
work, house painting, apartment-building maintenance, operating neighborhood taxis, cooking 
meals for others, and sewing. These occupations provided crucial supplemental income for 
welfare recipients . . . .”). 
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even though she likely qualifies, is not uncommon.175 Indeed, the take-
up rate for TANF is only 30.7 percent.176 In other words, only 30.7 
percent of families who qualify to receive TANF are actually receiving 
it. Latisha’s use of credit to smooth financial difficulties, rather than 
turning public assistance, is also not uncommon.177 However, as 
Latisha’s situation demonstrates, when someone uses a credit card but 
then cannot or does not pay back the debt, the consequences can 
multiply and result not only in cycles of endless debt, but also in trouble 
getting a job, housing, or other economic resources that promote 
mobility. And the absence of these economic resources can lead to 
downward mobility and the reproduction of poverty and inequality. 
When Latisha lost her job, the rational decision from an economic 
perspective may have been to seek whatever type of public assistance 
she could get. But many respondents expressed the same sentiment as 
Latisha—they did not, under any circumstances, want to seek public 
benefits. Even more striking was that most of the respondents who 
expressed this view seemed to understand that relying on credit might 
produce more financial hardship than seeking public benefits. All 
respondents were asked whether they had considered seeking TANF 
when they first experienced a financial emergency. Many respondents 
said they did not consider TANF, and when asked why, many answers 
were similar to Laurie’s: 
Honey, I sure was struggling. I was. But you may not know it, but 
TANF is welfare. Welfare. My mommy was on welfare and it was the 
worst thing. Those workers would come knocking on our door, 
judging her, judging us, treating us like scum. I’m better than  
 
 175. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 15, at 541–43. 
 176. Gilbert Crouse & Suzanne Macartney, Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 20 (2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/206736/Welfare
Indicators15thReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4HP-PW8V]. 
 177. See, e.g., José A. García, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: the Rapid Growth of Credit Card 
Debt in America, DĒMOS 1 (2007), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Demos_BorrowingEndsMeet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SD-48KX]; MANN, supra note 159, at 12–
13; Miles Rapoport & Jennifer Wheary, Running in Place: Where the Middle Class and the Poor 
Meet, D MOS 1, 8 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RunningInPlace0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AYC5-7GVM]; Catherine Ruetschlin & Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, The 
Challenge of Credit Card Debt for the African American Middle Class, D MOS 1 (2013), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/CreditCardDebt-Demos_NAACP_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DM77-AFS8]; Amy Traub & Catherine Ruetschlin, The Plastic Safety Net: 
Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit Card Debt of Low- and Middle-Income 
Households, DĒMOS 1–2 (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Plastic
SafetyNet-Demos.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RJ-V57E]; Greene, supra note 15, at 549–52; Mann, 
supra note 20, at 263–78; Littwin, supra note 16, at 457–59. 
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that . . . . So my credit might be screwed, but let them come after me. 
I have nothing to give them. Nothing. I’d rather talk to the damn 
collector than walk into social services any day. 
How might we make sense of Latisha, Laurie, and other 
respondents’ seemingly irrational behavior? The sociological theory of 
narratives can help.178 The concept of narratives indicates that people 
develop an understanding of themselves and their surroundings that 
can be observed in the personal narratives, or stories, they tell. Their 
actions are then shaped by these narratives.179 The narrative identity 
theory argues that when people are faced with two courses of action, 
they will pursue the path that is most consistent with their personal 
narratives and self-conceptions, rather than the path that might seem 
most rational to an outsider.180 Indeed, the narrative identity theory can 
be understood as an alternative to theories that predict peoples’ actions 
in response to rational calculations or cognitive biases.181 
In this study, we see parents taking actions regarding public 
benefits and credit that support the identities they have developed. The 
in-depth interviews allow us to observe conceptions of self-sufficiency 
 
 178. The concept of narratives has been used to understand a diverse array of actions related 
to social mobility and poverty. For examples of narratives used to understand social mobility and 
poverty, see generally ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF 
THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION (2001); ALFORD YOUNG, THE MINDS OF 
MARGINALIZED BLACK MEN: MAKING SENSE OF MOBILITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND FUTURE LIFE 
CHANCES (2004); and Eva Rosen, Horizontal Immobility: How Narratives of Neighborhood 
Violence Shape Housing Decisions, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 270 (2017). 
 179. For examples of how actions may be shaped by personal narratives, see generally 
FRANCESCA POLLETTA, IT WAS LIKE A FEVER: STORYTELLING IN PROTEST AND POLITICS 
(2006); Margaret Somers & Gloria D. Gibson, Reclaiming the Epistemological Other: Narratives 
and the Social Constitution of Identity, in SOCIAL THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 37 
(C. Calhoun ed.,1994); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of 
Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 AM. J. OF SOC. 1328 (2003).  
 180. Michelle Lamont & Mario Luis Small, How Culture Matters: Enriching our 
Understanding of Poverty, in THE COLORS OF POVERTY: WHY RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES EXIST 76, 76–102 (A.C. Lin & D.R. Harris eds., 2008). 
 181. See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 19–39 (2008) (discussing the psychological errors 
people typically make when making financial decisions and more generally explaining the 
psychological error strand of behavioral economics); Collins, supra note 20, at 8 (discussing 
theories of borrowing that involve cognitive biases that result in people mistakenly expecting to 
be able to pay off debt at a later date); Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and 
Decision-Making in Low-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, 
CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 20, at 121 (noting the 
traditional rational actor model of behavior posits that individuals are “highly rational, hold 
coherent, well-informed, and justified beliefs, and pursue their goals effectively, with little 
systematic error and no need for help”). 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
270  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:233 
through the personal narratives that respondents recounted about their 
decisions regarding public benefits and credit. Many respondents like 
Laurie and Latisha track their existing narratives to their time off 
welfare, a time during which they created narratives of self-sufficiency 
and they do not want to rupture these narratives. Utilizing credit is a 
way for them to avoid doing so, at least in the short term. 
Tori’s story highlights how loyalty to the self-sufficiency narrative 
can ultimately lead to significant downward mobility, particularly in 
light of the punishing credit system. Tori was plagued by dental 
problems for years, but she could not afford to go to a dentist, so she 
“just brushed [her teeth] real good.” One day, she woke up with 
excruciating pain in her mouth and went to the emergency room. She 
had an infection from a rotting tooth, but she was only given 
antibiotics, painkillers, and advice to see a dentist. She tried to ignore 
the problem again because the antibiotics seemed to help, but within a 
month, she again woke up in extreme pain. When Tori finally went to 
a dentist, she needed $735 worth of work done. She maxed out her 
credit card in order to pay for this dental work, but was hit with a 
second blow when, two weeks later, her car would not start when she 
tried to go to work. Tori learned that her car needed at least $500 worth 
of parts. She did not have the money or the available credit to pay for 
these parts, so she applied for a few new credit cards but was denied. 
Meanwhile, Tori continued to miss work. She was a receptionist at 
a hair salon about thirty minutes from her house. She described loving 
her job, saying “it was so much fun. Sometimes the girls would do my 
hair for free or give me tips on color. Everyone was nice.” Tori tried 
hard to get to work—advertising on Craigslist for a ride and asking 
friends to drive her. A few times, a friend said he would drive her but 
never showed up, and eventually, the owner of the salon lost her 
patience. Tori was fired over email, and was surprised at the 
impersonal and callous nature of the message, which informed her that 
she was being let go due to her “sporadic attendance.”182 Tori said she 
was “depressed” after the job loss. When asked if, at that point, she 
considered even temporarily seeking TANF, she said, “No, no, I 
wanted to solve my problem myself. I couldn’t believe I was fired, and 
I needed to take charge of me and my family. I had been making it. 
Really making it, all myself, and I really thought I would figure things 
out.” 
 
 182. During the interview, Tori even pulled the email up on her phone and read it out loud to 
me, exclaiming “[c]an you believe it? Just like that. She always faked that she was nice.”  
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] THE BOOTSTRAP TRAP 271 
Quickly, things deteriorated for Tori and her family: she got 
behind on her rent, her utilities, and on paying off credit card bills. Her 
landlord was accommodating and willing to accept IOUs and late rent 
for several months, but eventually asked her to voluntarily move out 
before she was evicted. Tori and her family spent some time in the 
homes of relatives, but their houses were too small for so many people 
and tensions rose. With the help of a teacher at her daughter’s school, 
Tori and her family moved into a homeless shelter. 
Tori stayed in the shelter for several months. Initially, she had 
trouble finding a job, but she eventually found one with an employer 
who did not conduct credit checks. However, the shelter had strict time 
limits for families, and families had to leave whether or not they had 
found another housing option. Tori was forced to relocate again. The 
first night out of the shelter, Tori and her children stayed at a hotel, 
one of many in the area that often housed families who could not get 
an apartment for one reason or another. 
The conditions in the hotel were subpar, and Tori had been 
hopeful that she would find an apartment since she had a job. She heard 
through the grapevine of other hotel inhabitants about a landlord who 
did not conduct credit checks, and Tori applied for and was approved 
for an apartment. Tori’s problem, however, was utilities. She needed 
to give the electric company a security deposit to connect service, and 
if not, needed a guarantor on her account, one who was in good 
standing with the energy company and had good credit.183 Since she 
could not provide either of these things, she was stuck in the hotel for 
the time being. I asked Tori whether the shelter provided any services 
to help with her credit, and her answer was the same as every other 
respondent who had lived in a shelter: a resounding “no.” 
Tori’s story is a worst-case scenario for people who try to make it 
on their own. Most respondents did not end up homeless as a result of 
their debt, but Tori’s situation is a useful illustration of how problems 
can pile up quickly, and, without financial help, can spiral out of 
control. Once this happens, even as a family attempts to rebuild, the 
collateral consequences of bad credit can make recovery almost 
impossible. At the time of an emergency, using credit to weather the 
 
 183. Several respondents reported that they could not obtain housing because of the credit 
policy of the electric company. The website of the main electric company in Durham, North 
Carolina, Duke Energy, states the same credit/security deposit/guarantor policy respondents had 
been reporting. See Start, Stop, & Move, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/ 
start-stop-move [https://perma.cc/G6W4-RSY5]. 
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problem made sense—respondents did not have to put anyone else out 
and they were able to feel like self-sufficient citizens. However, if they 
were unable to pay off their credit card bills right away, the interest and 
fees started to compile quickly. Or, if they did pay off the credit cards, 
then they were usually robbing Peter to pay Paul, and thus they then 
did not pay utility bills, rent, or whatever else had previously been part 
of their monthly budget. Thus, their payment histories, which make up 
roughly 35 percent of a FICO score, took a hit. This, in turn, would lead 
to more credit use, often maxing out cards, and thus, their credit 
utilization took a hit, affecting another roughly 30 percent of their 
FICO score. Further, once they maxed out cards, like Tori, it made 
sense to seek out more credit. But then, applying for credit leads to 
more credit inquiries, and that part of their score—about 10 percent of 
a FICO score—would take a hit. Scores would go down and reports 
would have more negative information. This, in turn, would make it 
hard to find a job, hard to find an apartment or house, and even hard 
to get utilities. 
C. A Surprising Catalyst of Downward Mobility and the 
Reproduction of Poverty and Inequality: Repairing Credit 
Through Self-Sufficiency 
The repeated use of credit cards by respondents, often in 
situations in which it seemed unlikely a respondent would be able to 
pay back the money borrowed, may lead one to conclude that 
respondents simply did not understand the importance of credit scores 
and reports; if they did understand the gravity of credit history, they 
would act rationally and seek help in any and all ways before utilizing 
credit. Most respondents, however, did seem to have a clear 
understanding of the importance of credit histories and scores. In fact, 
most respondents with credit problems were strikingly focused on their 
credit scores, with a deep intent to improve them. I asked respondents 
what their most important financial goal was for the next year, and 
many said improving their credit score.184 As Makayla said: 
I need to improve my score. It sucks right now, because I hit on hard 
times. . . . If only I can get a good report, I can bring my family up. We 
can move to a nice house, in a nice area. I try so hard. Heck, 
sometimes I eat baby food I get free so I don’t charge anything else 
 
 184. In some cases, in fact, respondents seemed to attach a perhaps overly optimistic picture 
of what their life would be like if they had a better credit score/report.  
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on my credit card. 
Other respondents referred to their credit reports or scores as “the 
most important thing in my life, right now, well besides my babies,” as 
“that darned thing that is destroying my life,” and as “my ticket to good 
neighborhoods and good schools for my kids.” Many respondents 
believed that a “good” credit score was the key to financial stability. 
One respondent, Maria, told a story about a friend who was able 
to improve his score. She said, “He figured out some way to get it up. 
Way up. I wish I knew what he did there, because I would do it. 
Because after that, everything was easy as pie for him. Got himself a 
better job, a better place to live, everything better.” Maria went to 
great lengths185 to try to improve her score so that she, too, could live a 
life where everything was “easy as pie.” 
Not only did many respondents see their credit report as an 
important passport to economic security, but they also viewed it as a 
potential source of pride, a symbol of making it—or not—in America. 
Just as they rejected welfare and other public benefits because 
accepting help was a sign they had failed and was inconsistent with 
their narratives as self-sufficient citizens, a good credit score had moral 
worth and a low score had to be excused. Some respondents who said 
they currently had low scores made a point of noting that their score 
was not always low, and before they came upon bad luck, they were 
actually one of the successful ones. For example, Inez said: 
[I]t’s low right now, and I gotta get it up. But you know what? I bet 
you’d never believe it but it was over 700! Over 700, you hear? Is 
yours even that high? I always fulfill my obligations. I’m not a 
deadbeat, I can promise you that. But then my baby got sick and all 
hell broke loose. It’s just not fair because everyone thinks I’m a 
deadbeat and my score probably looks like I am. But it’s bad luck. 
You know some people are bad luck magnets and some people are 
good luck magnets and I’m a bad luck magnet, I think. 
Another respondent, Christine, said in reference to her score: 
It’s so low, so low. I’m embarrassed to admit it, but it’s so low. It 
makes me feel low. I’ve got lots of bad stuff on my report. That’s why 
it’s so low. And I just got behind that one time because of that one 
root canal. I know it’s hard to believe. You probably think I’m like 
everyone else who just goes to Walmart and buys fancy sheets and 
 
 185. Maria tried saving money to pay off her debt, and eventually tried working with a private 
debt repair company in order to improve her credit score.  
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fancy utensils. I’m not. I go to the [thrift store]. My sheets COME 
with stains, and my score is too low. I don’t buy fancy things. Never 
have. I’m not wasteful and let me tell you, so many people are. So 
many people are, and then they whine about their scores when they’re 
charging up 400 thread count sheets! 
Inez, Christine, and other respondents engaged in what 
sociologists call symbolic boundary work186—they sought to distinguish 
themselves, as moral citizens, from other people with low scores, 
people they deemed to be taking advantage of the system. These 
boundaries are similar to those that former welfare recipients like 
Latisha made between themselves as moral citizens and their 
perceptions of fellow welfare recipients as immoral citizens taking 
advantage of the system. But this boundary work also gave them hope. 
They considered themselves hard workers and felt that at some point 
the system must reward that work. Despite being employed, Iris was 
living in a hotel because her credit score was so low that she had not 
been able to find an apartment. She expressed some optimism, saying: 
I show up to work at five a.m. every day. I might be behind on my 
bills, my score is so low, but somehow I will find a way to catch up and 
I’ll have a good score again. I can feel that someday I will. All I do is 
eat and sleep and work and help Jack with his homework. Day after 
day. Some way I will catch up and my score will catch up and we’ll get 
out of this hellhole and have a real home again, a real home for Jack, 
Chris, and Al. I work hard. Take care of myself. It’s gotta pay off some 
day. 
Many respondents understood the importance of good credit, yet they 
held onto the belief—indeed, the belief welfare reformers would want 
them to hold onto—that if they work hard, they will eventually “make 
it.” As welfare reformers said, the respondents believed that the system 
should, and would, “make work pay.”187 
In order to speed up the process, many respondents looked into 
ways to free themselves of the negative debt cycles in which they were 
trapped. The consumer bankruptcy system is designed to help relieve 
debt, and, going into the interviews, I assumed bankruptcy would be 
front and center on the minds of respondents who were trapped in debt 
cycles. I thought their concern might be how to pay for a bankruptcy 
 
 186. Michèle Lamont & Virág Molnár, The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, 28 
ANN. REV. SOC. 167, 167–68 (2002) (discussing the importance of the role of boundaries as a 
theoretical concept in social science scholarship).  
 187. See Alstott, supra note 11, at 287. 
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lawyer. What I learned when I asked respondents a series of questions 
about their perceptions of bankruptcy and those who filed for it was 
that many respondents viewed bankruptcy as just another failure—
similar to having to rely on welfare. For these respondents, bankruptcy 
was inconsistent with their narratives as self-sufficient citizens. Ellen, 
one respondent, said, “really, bankruptcy is for, well, the scum, because 
they’re stealing other people’s money. Never in a million years would 
I do it. It’s worse than welfare. I mean it’s bad. Really bad. . . .” 
Alternatively, though, many respondents who were seeking help with 
their debt saw debt settlement as a potential moral answer to their 
problems. 
Another respondent, Carmen, was trapped in debt due to a 
needed car repair. She said: 
I’m about to get things under control. You know I saw an ad for a 
company who does it for you. I can’t explain it, but you give them 
some money, and then they talk to all the companies, everyone, and 
whoosh! Your debt goes away! And your credit goes up because no 
more debt! 
She went on to say: 
I’m no Donald Trump, and the man even said to me how he was so 
impressed I’m taking care of this myself, not asking the government 
to give me money in bankruptcy. That’s just wrong. I’m no crook like 
Trump. But here I give the company money. I pay them. It is a service 
and then somehow they just take care of it for me. They are very 
connected. They are lawyers, actually. People of the law. They know 
people. They get it done. I was very impressed. 
Debt settlement and debt consolidation188 are consistent with a 
 
 188. Most respondents used the terms debt settlement and debt consolidation 
interchangeably, or were confused about which process they were actually enrolled in or looking 
at. Sometimes, companies even use the terms interchangeably. There are many different debt 
consolidation plans available, but debt consolidation companies often offer one large loan to the 
consumer that is then used to pay off several smaller loans. See I’ve Seen a lot of Advertisements 
for Companies that Consolidate Credit Card Debt. Are These Legitimate?, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1859/ive-seen-
lot-advertisements-companies-consolidate-credit-card-debt-are-these-legitimate.html 
[https://perma.cc/P249-HW4B]. Like debt settlement companies, debt consolidation companies 
typically claim “that their services will reduce the consumer’s monthly payment or total debt” and 
“improve [consumers’] credit rating[s].” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, National Debt 
Consolidation Scheme Misleads Consumers About Costs, Benefits, and Nonprofit Status (Jan. 8, 
2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/01/national-debt-consolidation-
scheme-misleads-consumers-about-costs [https://perma.cc/C4XU-DRT9]. And like debt 
settlement, debt consolidation has many risks and can result in higher interest rates and monthly 
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self-sufficiency narrative because the companies charge a fee for their 
services (typically 20–25 percent of enrolled debt)189 while promising to 
reduce a consumer’s debt by negotiating with their creditors. Many 
companies advertise that consumers see “over 50 percent of their debt 
written off . . .” and that consumers are typically “debt free in as little 
as 36 months.”190 Ellen, who was so critical of bankruptcy, had a very 
different tune when she talked about debt settlement. She said, “Well, 
debt settlement is like, you pay for what you get. It’s fair to everyone 
and everyone gets things. I’m just starting the process but it’s a big, 
huge relief.” Another respondent said she preferred debt settlement to 
bankruptcy because, “it’s not asking for a handout. I paid to try to solve 
my problem.” 
Some respondents said that industry representatives specifically 
sold themselves as a moral alternative to bankruptcy and government 
“handouts,” and that this was appealing to them. This is consistent with 
how some debt settlement companies advertise their services on the 
internet. For example, under the heading “Moral Debt Settlement,” 
one company’s website says: 
The great thing about using a trustworthy debt relief company is that 
by using the debt settlement program you will repay your creditors 
the honorable way. You are not choosing to use bankruptcy as an 
option to eliminate credit card debt. You are choosing the honorable 
path so creditors will be paid.191 
Theoretically, debt settlement appears to be a desirable 
alternative to consumers filing for bankruptcy. It prevents our 
bankruptcy system from being flooded with debtors, and it diminishes 
the adversarial part of the bankruptcy process between debtors and 
creditors. Instead, the two sides come to an “agreement.” The problem, 
however, is that the credit relief industry is risky for consumers.192 
 
payments than consumers started with. ELLEN HARNICK & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A ROLL OF THE DICE: DEBT SETTLEMENT STILL A RISKY STRATEGY 
FOR DEBT-BURDENED HOUSEHOLDS 7 (2013). For the purposes of this Part, I have used the 
term debt settlement because that is the term that was more frequently used by respondents.  
 189. LESLIE PARRISH & ELLEN HARNICK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, STATE OF 
LENDING: DEBT SETTLEMENT 3 (2014).  
 190. Id. at 2. 
 191. Is-Debt-Settlement-Moral, DEBT SETTLEMENT GROUP, INC., https://debtsettlement
group.com/is-debt-settlement-moral [https://perma.cc/SZK6-8N6K]. 
 192. See Debt Settlement: Fraudulent, Abusive, and Deceptive Practices Pose Risk to 
Consumers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., U.S. Senate (Statement 
of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Dir. Forensic Audits & Special Investigations) (2010); HARNICK 
& PARRISH, supra note 188, at 2; Justin P. Nelson, Note, Federal Oversight of the Debt Relief 
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Debt-settlement programs typically require consumers to stop paying 
their debts and instead make regular payments into a dedicated third-
party account, though this of course causes the client to default on their 
debts and accrue late charges and fees. Once the third-party account 
holds adequate funds, the settlement company negotiates with the 
client’s creditors, asking that the client have to pay only a percentage 
of the total amount owed. 
Debt settlement is risky for consumers because many consumers 
are unable to settle enough debts to experience a positive change in 
financial position relative to their condition at the time of 
enrollment.193 Defaulting on debts can have negative consequences 
because it can trigger collection activity to occur. A study of one debt-
settlement company found that one-third of the customers enrolled 
with the company faced lawsuits from their creditors, and many of the 
customers were not aware this had happened until their wages were 
garnished.194 Ultimately, many debt settlement arrangements leave 
consumers with more debt and less money, since consumers pay high 
fees to settlement companies, often with no ultimate payoff.195 
The FTC was concerned enough about the potential abusive 
nature of debt settlement arrangements that it investigated the debt 
settlement industry and ultimately promulgated new rules regarding 
the industry in 2010.196 The most significant change was an advance-fee 
ban, which allowed firms to collect fees only when a settlement 
agreement was reached and at least one payment was made by the 
consumer to a creditor.197 However, there are many loopholes that 
allow companies to continue to charge upfront fees.198 Additionally, 
many firms have simply defied the new FTC rules, and as a result, the 
 
Industry: A More Effective Means of Deterring Illegal Debt Settlement Schemes, 75 OHIO STATE 
L.J. 41, 42–43 (2014). 
 193. HARNICK & PARRISH, supra note 188, at 5–6, 11. 
 194. Id. at 5. 
 195. Debt Settlement: Fraudulent, Abusive, and Deceptive Practices Pose Risk to Consumers: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., supra note 192. 
 196. HARNICK & PARRISH, supra note 188, at 6. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Firms quickly found a way around this rule because it and other state laws exempted 
attorneys from debt settlement regulations. Now, firms loosely associate with attorneys, even 
though the attorneys often do not actually perform much, if any, debt settlement work. The 
company can then charge high up-front fees free from regulation, often leaving consumers worse 
off than before they engaged the company. Id. at 7. Further, the FTC’s jurisdiction is limited by 
the scope of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and thus, debt settlement companies that provide for 
certain face-to-face transactions are excluded, as are any programs in which all of the activity is 
conducted online. Id.  
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FTC has brought scores of suits against such companies.199 
The relationship of many respondents to bankruptcy and the debt 
settlement industry underscores the concern that, in some cases, 
respondents who have most internalized a self-sufficiency narrative can 
end up worse off financially than those who are willing to seek swift 
help from the government, in this case through bankruptcy. As stated 
by the Supreme Court, the purpose of consumer bankruptcy is to give 
the “honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a 
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.”200 While the long-term utility of 
bankruptcy for debtors is unresolved, recent research shows that 
people who file for bankruptcy end up better off financially across a 
host of indicators.201 Yet some respondents see bankruptcy as a moral 
failing counter to their self-perceived notions of self-sufficiency, and 
they are instead attracted to an industry that the FTC has called 
abusive to consumers.202 They behave counter to what appears to be 
the rational economic decision because they act in the manner most 
consistent with their self-sufficiency narrative203—in this case paying 
for a service that promises to help relieve debt in a way similar to 
 
 199. Debt Relief and Credit Repair Scams, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/consumer-finance/debt-relief-credit-repair-scams [https://perma.
cc/MBV8-ES8J] (“The FTC has brought scores of law enforcement actions against these bogus 
credit-related services, and the agency has partnered with the states to bring hundreds of 
additional lawsuits.”).  
 200. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).  
 201. Will Dobbie, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Crystal Yang, Consumer Bankruptcy and 
Financial Health (Mar. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.princeton.edu/~wdobbie/
files/dgy_bankruptcy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN3B-R6CQ].  
 202. Debt Relief and Credit Repair Scams, supra note 199. 
 203. Anecdotally, I have been informed that consumer bankruptcy attorneys are aware of this 
problem and actively work to dispel consumers of their notion that debt settlement is a productive 
moral alternative to bankruptcy. In a conversation with Ed Boltz, a consumer bankruptcy 
attorney in Durham, North Carolina and former president of the National Association of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, he told me that after he initially meets with clients, they 
routinely decide that they do not want to file for bankruptcy and instead seek out debt settlement, 
only to come back to him a year or two later, in a much worse financial position. Interview with 
Ed Boltz, Partner, The Law Offices of John T. Orcutt (June 29, 2016). Additionally, law firms 
often address the issue of morality and bankruptcy versus debt settlement issue on their websites, 
warning consumers about some of the pitfalls of debt settlement. See, e.g., Fred Nix & Laura 
Margulies, Are Debt Settlement Programs an Alternative to Filing for Bankruptcy?, LAURA 
MARGULIES & ASSOCIATES LLC, https://law-margulies.com/settlement-alternative-bankruptcy/ 
[https://perma.cc/W7M9-753U] (“Many people view this [debt settlement] as the ‘moral’ thing to 
do because they are at least trying to repay their debts. But instead, they have made themselves 
vulnerable to further financial harm. . . . After a great deal of lost time and money [having tried 
debt settlement], our clients find themselves in the position of filing for bankruptcy anyway.”). 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] THE BOOTSTRAP TRAP 279 
consumer bankruptcy.204 As the next Section discusses, respondents 
who were willing to file for bankruptcy often found it a quick and 
relatively easy way to relieve debt. 
D. Seeking out Lifelines: The Deserving Recipient Narrative 
Belinda, a single mother of three children, is too young to 
remember life before TANF. Before I interviewed her, she had worked 
for several years at a fast food restaurant in Durham, North Carolina. 
She had started as a part-time worker, and was quickly promoted to 
franchise manager. Her promotion gave her just enough money to get 
by, with the help, at times, of the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
Program (SNAP), commonly known as food stamps.205 This all changed 
when her seven-year-old’s asthma flared uncontrollably for several 
months. He was in and out of hospitals, getting admitted for nights at 
a time because standard breathing treatments did not work, and 
Belinda called in sick one too many times and lost her job. When she 
learned she was “let go,” she immediately filed for unemployment 
benefits. She also went to the Department of Social Services’ office and 
learned that she might qualify for TANF, so she applied for that too. 
Meanwhile, she inquired about increasing a rent subsidy she had been 
receiving—she was not sure it was possible because she thought work 
might be tied to the subsidy—and also about receiving more food 
stamps. Belinda explained: 
I needed all the help I could get. I looked into everything. Shane was 
so sick. So sick. I asked everyone, what kind of programs are available 
for us? I thought there must be more help. And it took so long to get. 
That was the problem. So that’s where my sisters came in. My uncles, 
anyone I could ask. I needed help before the government decided it 
was going to step in. And we support each other, so I got that help. 
The last thing I wanted to do was use my emergency card. I know how 
that goes. I’ve been down that road. If I had to I would have, but my 
 
 204. Some respondents who were relatively far along in the debt settlement process had 
begun to realize the problems with the industry. One respondent, Wendy, said, “I was dumb. 
Tricked really. I saw an ad on the computer and I clicked on it and it sounded too good to be true. 
But I was struggling, but at that time my credit was still pretty good. It was getting out of hand 
after all those problems and when I saw the ad I thought this is it. I can’t even tell you what they 
promised me. But now I know it’s BS. It’s so messy I don’t even understand it all, and I’ve been 
on hold for hours at a time with no answers. No answers and shot credit and still so many debts. 
My tax return was screwed. Everything was screwed.” 
 205. The food stamps program was replaced with SNAP in 2008. However, SNAP recipients 
usually refer to the program as food stamps, and thus, this Article refers to the program as food 
stamps.  
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uncle stepped up. . . . One worker, a food stamps girl, was a bitch and 
a half. But I have a sick child, so what’s her problem? It’s not like I 
wanted this. My babies have to eat, and my uncle couldn’t cover us 
forever. He has his own problems. 
Shane’s asthma finally got under control when the weather began 
to warm up. He was back to attending school regularly, and Belinda 
knew it was time to seriously look for a new job. Belinda had been 
successful in getting some benefits she had applied for, and between 
those benefits and help from her family, she was able to stay afloat. She 
never did use her “emergency” credit card. She was able to pay most 
of her bills on time, and was able to obtain work at another restaurant, 
also as a manager, relatively quickly. 
For Belinda, what could have been a catastrophic financial event 
with long-term credit history consequences turned out to be a stressful 
but manageable time in her life. There were few long-term financial 
consequences, largely because Belinda sought out help right away and 
received it.206 Her credit history was not affected because her payment 
history, her credit utilization, the age of her credit accounts, and the 
types of credit under her name did not change. 
About a quarter of the parents interviewed also recounted times 
they immediately sought help after struggling with unanticipated 
financial hardship. Woven into their stories was an acknowledgement 
that they needed help to stay afloat, but there was much variation in 
where the help was sought: family, friends, church or other religious 
institutions, unemployment benefits, food stamp benefits, food 
pantries, school clothing drives, TANF, housing vouchers, nonprofits, 
and even bankruptcy—the list went on, depending on the problem and 
individual circumstances. 
These parents who sought help primarily employed what I call the 
“deserving recipient” narrative. Several of these parents expressed the 
belief that public benefits programs existed to help them, and they 
were entitled to take advantage of these benefits because they had 
been hit with hard times through no fault of their own. One mother, 
Trish, had been fired by a boss who she described as unstable. She was 
 
 206. It is important to note that another variable that worked in Belinda’s favor was that she 
had family members willing and able to help. If this help had not been available, it is not clear 
that the social services Belinda had applied for would have come through in time to prevent her 
from having to use credit to stay afloat. If Belinda had used credit, she likely would have ended 
up with unmanageable debt, like others who invoked deserving recipient narratives, as described 
infra in this Part.  
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bitter and felt like she had had very bad luck, saying, “[s]omeone’s 
gonna get welfare. Might as well be me. I’m struggling, and it’s because 
of my fucking ex-boss. I’ll take his tax money any day.” Trish applied 
for and received TANF, enrolled in a job program through social 
services, and was able to combine a number of public benefits with help 
from a family member so that she did not go into severe debt while 
finding a new job. She got behind on a few utility payments, but as she 
said: 
I cut a lot, I cut everything unnecessary, and I called those companies, 
and I said look, work out a plan with me. I can’t pay everything right 
now but I can pay some. And they did. I didn’t even have to pay all 
my heat [bill]. They have programs for people like me. I don’t even 
owe them.” 
Trish acknowledged she was in financial trouble, but she did not feel 
that her troubles were her own fault. She invoked narratives describing 
herself as a deserving recipient of help, and she acted in accordance 
with these narratives, seeking help wherever she could get it. 
Indeed, almost all parents who invoked a deserving recipient 
narrative were sure to explain why their family was different, and their 
family truly needed the help. These parents created moral boundaries 
between themselves and others who may receive benefits or seek 
help.207 Mel, a home health worker, told me about a time she needed 
to borrow money from friends and family members when her daughter 
needed extensive dental work. She explained that she was quite good 
with money, noting “I’m very careful and very responsible about 
money,” but that the dental work “was so surprising. I mean she 
brushes her teeth twice a day. She flosses!” She went on to say: 
Look, I only do the big ask when I need it. I needed to protect her 
teeth, her mouth, but I also needed to make sure we all had food at 
the end of the month. I was stuck. My cousin, now she does the big 
ask all the time, and I guarantee you it’s because she bought too many 
fancy panties at Victoria Secrets. She doesn’t know need from want. 
So I never give her anything. I don’t think my family does either, not 
anymore. They understood with me. I couldn’t lose my house, our 
food, everything I’ve worked for. They know I only ask for the needs. 
Most respondents who invoked deserving recipient narratives 
 
 207. This boundary creation by families who sought help has been documented in other 
studies of low-income families. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 15, at 523 (noting families who had 
received welfare created moral boundaries between themselves and other welfare recipients).  
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specifically described trying to avoid the use of credit. Many of them 
said, in various ways, that credit card companies took advantage of 
people; they noted that this awareness and resistance to using credit 
justified their use of alternative forms of help. Mel, for example, said: 
I thought about just charging it. . . . I’ve learned my lesson, learned it 
hard, and using a card would make everything go to hell. Yeah, I 
wouldn’t get a bill from the dentist, but my $700 bill would be $7000 
by the end of the year! And my credit would go to hell! They love 
screwing people like me. That’s their number one goal. Did you know 
that? Screwing people and then laughing about it. So I know who I 
have to ask first, family, who don’t want to screw me. I feel bad, but I 
do what I have to do for my kids. It’s all about them. Them and their 
shiny white teeth. 
Another respondent, Marie, explained: 
I have emergency cards for things like this, but I know how it goes. 
Same with payday loans. You know they have online ones now. Just 
a few clicks and the money is yours. But I have to try everything else 
first, because then my credit is screwed, then I’m screwed, then my 
family is screwed. . . . What can I do to protect my score, my hard 
work, my sweat, when shitty things happen? So if I have to step right 
into that food pantry, I do it, and I try to leave with my soul intact. I 
try not to cry. I try to remember why, why I don’t want to just click 
away. It’s oh so easy, and then I can buy my babies food. What they 
want. But if they have to eat Jif peanut butter, so be it, because that 
score matters, even more than peanut butter, and Aidan loves him 
some Skippy. 
Of course, not all respondents who invoked a deserving recipient 
narrative were able to avoid the use of credit and a downward financial 
trajectory. Indeed, many of them sought help but it either did not come 
fast enough, or ran out too soon. However, most respondents who 
invoked a deserving recipient narrative indicated they were open to 
filing for bankruptcy or had already done so. For example, about a year 
before our interview, April, a mother of four, was told by her landlord 
that he was selling her building and she would have to move out within 
60 days. The expense of moving was much more than April had 
anticipated, and she had to seek help to cover the actual costs of 
moving her household items, a new (and higher) security deposit, and 
a few odds and ends she needed for her new apartment. All of April’s 
family and friends were strapped for cash, though she reported that she 
did ask them for help. April turned to credit cards not only for the items 
she needed, but also as a way to cover expenses she usually paid for in 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] THE BOOTSTRAP TRAP 283 
cash, thus making the cash available for the security deposit. At the 
time of her interview, April was looking into filing for bankruptcy. She 
said: 
[M]an, it’s actually expensive to file! But I have debt, a lot of it, and I 
need to get rid of it. I mean, Donald Trump files, so why can’t I? I 
don’t want to, but I think I might have to. I’ve been thinking about it, 
calling around. I have to find the money to file so it might be waiting 
for tax time.208 
Another respondent, Latoya, talked about her bankruptcy after being 
out of work for over a year during the recession and relying on credit 
to get by: 
I did have to file, actually. Funny you ask. Legal Aid will actually do 
it for you. I did it myself first, can you believe? But I messed it up, and 
messed it up bad, and it got rejected by the judge, or something. 
Trying to save money. Always me trying to save money. 
When I asked her how she had learned about bankruptcy, she said: 
My neighbor had told me about it actually. I thought places like 
Kmart filed for bankruptcy, but I could too! Can you imagine? It’s 
this hidden thing, actually, they try not to tell you, because it’s a good 
deal. All those debts went away. I was worried about it, and it sucked 
for my score, but my score was dropping so much every month, I think 
it helped. Now I can breathe and I’m working, and it’s going up again. 
I even checked. You can do it, free, did you know? 
The data from this study cannot predict whether these 
respondents will ultimately be better off financially than respondents 
who invoked a self-sufficiency narrative and did not file for 
bankruptcy, despite financial troubles. As noted previously, the data 
on the long-term financial trajectory of those who successfully file for 
bankruptcy are mixed.209 
 
 208. Ronald Mann and Katherine Porter’s research suggests that many bankruptcy filers wait 
to file for bankruptcy until they receive their tax returns as a way to afford the lawyer and filing 
fees. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 319–
22 (2010). 
 209. See, e.g., Katherine Porter & Dr. Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh 
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 69 (2006) (finding that one year after they had filed for bankruptcy, 
65 percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers indicated that their financial situations had improved 
since they filed Chapter 7, but more than one-third of debtors indicated that their financial 
situations were actually the same as or worse than before they filed for bankruptcy); Dobbie et 
al., supra note 201, at 26. 
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E. Narrative Ruptures 
Narratives are malleable, adapting and expanding to 
accommodate new information and experiences.210 Certain events 
strain their coherence; in the context of self-sufficiency and finances, 
homelessness is an example of one such event. 
Some respondents experienced a narrative rupture, and their 
prevailing narrative transformed from one of self-sufficiency to one of 
deserving recipient. This transformation was spurred by an event or 
struggle that was so hard to reconcile with their existing self-sufficiency 
narrative that their prevailing narrative changed. Wanda’s story 
illustrates this point: Wanda talked about the year 2000, which she 
called her “hell year.” Her car’s transmission broke. She could not 
afford to replace it, and she lost her job because she did not have a way 
to get to work. She resisted asking for help because, as she said, “I 
already had played the aid game. It sucked. . . . I wasn’t going to go 
there again. I wanted to do things myself. Take care of myself. “ Wanda 
tried to go it alone, and ended up homeless because she could not pay 
her rent. That was in 2000. In 2016, Wanda rents an apartment she is 
proud of and has a job as an administrative assistant that she claims to 
“love.” Her job is forty-five minutes from her house, and she reported 
that her 1996 Ford Taurus just recently “gave out” on the way to work. 
She needed six hundred dollars to fix it, and Wanda did not have the 
money. But, as she said: 
Oh man oh man I learned my lesson! God help me, anyone help me. 
I needed help and I needed it fast. No more dumb “Wanda I got this” 
talk. No more shame. No more need to prove anything. I asked 
family. I went to church and asked them. I asked my kids’ school. 
Anyone! Everyone! I needed that money and quick. Heck I went to 
DSS and asked for a loan. They laughed at me, really they laughed, 
but it was worth a try. And I got it! In less than three days. Church 
came through. My friends came through. And who would have 
thought, Zeke’s school came through. I saved myself because I put 
aside my pride. I learned my lesson. Help, help, help, get it when you 
need it, quick. 
Wanda and other respondents like her had learned the realities of 
the incentive structure of the new safety net. Essentially, they had 
discovered the bootstrap trap. They learned through experience to put 
aside their desire for self-sufficiency—for pulling themselves up by the 
 
 210. Rosen, supra note 178, at 271.  
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bootstraps—in order to avoid further financial failure. One could 
interpret the lesson of the data in this study as showing that we need to 
disrupt the self-sufficiency narrative of low-income families. Indeed, 
respondents like Tori ended up homeless due in part to their 
commitment to self-sufficiency, while at least some respondents who 
have adopted a deserving recipient narrative seem to better be able to 
weather unexpected financial emergencies. However, there are several 
key reasons I do not think this is the best approach. 
First, findings from this study and my past work show that 
narratives of self-sufficiency lead to pride and motivation towards 
upward mobility for many respondents.211 Not only do they desire to 
adhere to a self-sufficiency narrative, but the narrative and sense of 
one’s self as a self-sufficiency citizen is a motivating factor to work 
towards upward mobility goals.212 It allows them to feel pride and a 
sense of economic citizenship in a way that depending on TANF and 
having to ask for what in their minds are “handouts” from other 
sources did not. Further, even for families who are willing to seek help, 
in many cases the current safety net is inadequate. As Luke Shaefer 
and Kathryn Edin have noted, some people who seek TANF and 
qualify are denied benefits for unclear reasons.213 And most 
importantly, often when people experience unexpected financial 
emergencies, as several respondents in this study did, they need money 
right away. If they do not have family or friends to rely on, often the 
wait for public benefits is just too long, and whether they adhere to a 
self-sufficiency narrative or a deserving recipient narrative, they have 
to use credit in order to weather the shock. Ultimately, those who 
invoke a self-sufficiency narrative may be particularly at risk for a 
financial catastrophe. However, seeking help, as those who invoke the 
deserving recipient narrative often do, is by no means a guarantee of 
financial resilience due to the very limited options for help available, 
particularly when someone experiences an unexpected financial 
emergency.  
The data from this study and other studies like it show how the 
new safety net is simply not enough to help struggling families maintain 
financial resilience in the wake of income and expenditure fluctuations 
and unexpected financial emergencies. By examining existing 
proposed reforms, the following Part illuminates their strengths and 
 
 211. See Tach & Greene, infra note 239, at 28–29.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Edin & Schaefer, supra note 93. 
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weaknesses and helps highlight how a new proposal could better 
address some of the flaws in the current safety net. 
IV.  EXISTING PROPOSED REFORMS 
This Part discusses some existing reform proposals aimed at 
helping struggling families stay afloat. Because the universe of 
proposals is expansive, this discussion is limited to three key types of 
proposals: those aimed at reducing the collateral consequences of the 
credit system; those aimed at helping families manage unexpected 
emergencies; and those aimed at providing more direct cash benefits to 
struggling families. Within each category, I am able to touch only on 
some of the many existing proposals for change. Several of these 
proposals would be transformative for the respondents in this study, as 
well as other struggling families. My proposal, however, is aimed at 
addressing some of the specific issues uncovered in the data from this 
study, while also taking into account what we already know about the 
ways in which families struggle to stay afloat. 
A. Reducing the Collateral Consequences of the Credit System 
1. Banning the Use of Credit Reports in Hiring.  There have been 
several studies of the relationship between an employee’s credit report 
and his job performance. Consistently, these studies have found no 
relationship between credit reports and productivity, disciplinary 
actions, or terminations.214 In fact, the studies have been so consistent 
in finding no predictive value in credit reports that even Eric 
Rosenberg, the Director of State Governmental Relations at 
TransUnion, testified to the Oregon legislature that, “we don’t have 
any research to show any statistical correlation between what’s in 
somebody’s credit report and their job performance or their likelihood 
to commit fraud.”215 This was after testifying to Connecticut legislators 
in 2009 that TransUnion markets its credit reports to employers 
 
 214. Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to Hiring Decision?, 39 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 2–5 (2011) (observing that although credit reports may seem useful to employers, no 
definitive studies establish that they predict employee behavior); Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry 
K. Palmer, Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Performance Appraisal Ratings or 
Termination Decisions? 15 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 106, 115–17 (2012); Andrew Weaver, Is 
Credit Status a Good Signal of Productivity?, 68 ILR REV. 742, 767 (2015).  
 215. Andrew Martin, As a Hiring Filter, Credit Checks Draw Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/business/10credit.html [https://perma.cc/HHD6-
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because screening employees is “critical to protect the safety of 
Connecticut residents in their homes and offices, in their cars and in all 
other places they travel.”216 
With no predictive value, a potential for harm, and the appearance 
of shady marketing by the credit industry, several proposals have 
focused on limiting the use of credit reports in hiring.217 These 
proposals have extended to legislation, and in 2013, several senators 
proposed the Equal Employment for All Act of 2013,218 which would 
prevent employers from requiring credit report disclosure as part of 
the job application process. Although the Senate has not moved on this 
bill, eleven states have passed laws limiting the use of employment 
credit checks, as have New York City and Chicago.219 
Researchers have studied the effects of these local and state bans. 
One study found that the bans did benefit some groups, such as those 
in the lowest credit score census tracts, but generated relatively worse 
outcomes for those in middle to low credit score census tracts and for 
black people.220 Researchers also looked at 74 million job listings 
between 2007 and 2013, before and after the bans.221 They found that 
when a ban on the use of credit reports in hiring went into effect, 
employers increased their demands for other supposed indications of 
an applicant’s potential job performance, such as education and 
experience.222 They also noted that there is some possibility that 
employers began to rely on racial stereotypes to screen candidates, 
although this was not measured.223 Another study of bans on the use of 
 
 216. Id.  
 217. See, e.g., Amy Traub & Sean McElwee, Bad Credit Shouldn’t Block Employment: How 
to Make State Bans on Employment Credit Checks More Effective, DĒMOS 1, http://
www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/BadCreditShouldntBlockEmployment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GX9V-C8VD]; Brown, supra note 214, at 2–5. For legislation focused on 
banning the use of credit reports in hiring, see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 218. Equal Employment for All Act of 2013, S. 1837, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 219. See Traub & McElwee, supra note 217, at 1; Use of Credit Information in Employment 
2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/financial-services-and-commerce/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2015-
legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/DG4Q-SMRQ] (identifying the states with restrictions as 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington). 
 220. Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Score”: Employer Credit Check Bans 
and Signal Substitution 3–4 (May 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/ 
files/shoag/files/clifford_and_shoag_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZW7-9DUC]. 
 221. Id. at 9. 
 222. Id. at 20.  
 223. Id. at 20–22. 
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credit reports in hiring found reduced job-finding rates for black 
applicants of 7 to 16 log points.224 
The arguments for and against banning the use of credit reports in 
hiring are certainly complex, and more data is needed to fully 
understand the effects of such bans.225 Even if the use of credit reports 
for employment purposes is banned, one of the most significant 
questions is how far these bans would need to go to protect families. 
For example, a simple Google search can bring up information about 
debt judgments against a potential applicant. Would employers be 
banned from conducting such searches? And what about other 
background checks that may take credit into account, but are not 
technically credit checks?226 The availability of big data in forms 
outside of credit reports is growing each day, and as research on credit 
reports shows, employers seek alternate information when they are 
banned from accessing credit reports.227 
While we cannot know exactly how the evolving background 
check industry will affect financially struggling families, existing data 
suggests that bans may not ultimately protect families from the 
consequences of bad credit. This is particularly true because the 
consequences go beyond employment—they extend to housing, 
utilities, and car insurance, among other areas. Thus, though bans may 
be part of the solution, it seems that a more comprehensive solution 
would focus on the root of the problem—trying to prevent families 
from having problematic credit scores and reports in the first place. 
 
 224. Alexander W. Bartik & Scott T. Nelson, Credit Reports as Resumes: The Incidence of 
Pre-Employment Credit Screening 19–20 (Mar. 7, 2015) (unpublished graduate student research 
paper, MIT) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
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the Box and Perverse Consequences, Part I, ONLABOR (Aug. 2, 2016), https://onlabor. 
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[https://perma.cc/N3Q3-AUBS]; Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, 
and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment (Aug. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 [https://perma.cc/84C9-CHBF]. 
 226. See Thomas Ahern, Use of Big Data for Background Checks Will Be Closely Watched for 
Potential Discrimination Issues, EMP’T SCREENING RES. (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.esrcheck.
com/wordpress/2016/12/12/use-of-big-data-for-background-checks-will-be-closely-watched-for-
potential-discrimination-issues/ [https://perma.cc/MV5X-PY9P]; John Rossheim, Algorithmic 
Hiring: Why Hire by Numbers?, MONSTER, https://hiring.monster.com/ hr/hr-best-
practices/recruiting-hiring-advice/strategic-workforce-planning/hiring-algorithms.aspx [https://
perma.cc/FF3M-Y4KY]. 
 227. See Ahern, supra note 226; Rossheim, supra note 226; supra notes 214, 219. 
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2. Changing Credit Report and Score Reporting Measures.  
Another strain of research and advocacy focuses on the way that 
algorithms used in big data systems, such as credit scoring, potentially 
disadvantage historically vulnerable groups.228 The concern is that 
information provided on credit reports and used to calculate credit 
scores, though non-discriminatory on its face, still results in a disparate 
impact on disadvantaged groups.229 For example, studies have shown 
that there are fewer commercial bank branches in poor communities 
and communities of color, but many more after-market institutions 
such as payday lenders.230 Instead of receiving safe, low-cost and 
affordable financial products, these communities are targeted for 
unsustainable, higher-cost products that ultimately wreak havoc on 
credit reports and scores. 
In some cases, the discriminatory practices are not subtle. For 
example, it is well-documented that subprime lenders target poor 
minority communities, while mainstream lenders avoid these 
communities. Data show that in 2005 and 2006, 54 percent of African-
Americans and 47 percent of Latinos received subprime loans, 
 
 228. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 147, at 679, 684–85. Authors Solon Barocas and 
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embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the source code and predictive algorithms” 
and thus that the scoring process can prove discriminatory, have a disparate impact, and even 
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supra note 147, at 7–8, 11. 
 229. Rice & Swesnik, supra note 115, at 952. 
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compared with roughly 17 percent of whites.231 Black people were 
disproportionately targeted to receive subprime loans compared to 
similarly situated whites, so the disparity is not simply a disparity of 
income levels.232 Indeed, the Department of Justice recently settled a 
$335 million lawsuit with Countrywide because of its discriminatory 
practices, which included steering black and Latino borrowers who 
qualified for prime loans into subprime mortgages.233 Several other 
major lenders have either settled or are in the process of defending 
lawsuits that allege similar practices.234 
Compounding the problem, discriminatory practices among 
creditors can have sweeping consequences. Because financial products 
that make repayment impossible result in negative markers on credit 
reports, it follows that such products can lead to worse hiring outcomes 
since we know many employers conduct credit checks as part of the job 
application process.235 This then means that applicants have little or no 
money to pay bills, which results in an even more problematic credit 
report and score, which in turn results in an inability to qualify for 
useful financial products and decent housing, among other 
consequences. In short, scholars and advocates argue that unfair credit 
practices result in unfair credit reports—reports with more potential 
red flags—for traditionally disadvantaged groups including the poor. 
This, in turn, can lead to disadvantage in labor markets.236 
To address this problem, advocates have suggested the following 
changes in credit reporting: shortening the reporting period for adverse 
information from seven years to three years, limiting reporting of 
defaults on financial products that the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau deems unsafe, and banning medical debt from being reported 
on credit reports.237 
There is little doubt that many, if not all, of these measures would 
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help struggling families. There is also little doubt, however, that none 
of these measures would protect families from falling into enduring 
negative debt cycles when an unexpected financial hardship hits. First, 
shortening the reporting period of adverse information from seven to 
three years would certainly help keep credit reports a bit cleaner, but 
for many respondents in this study, the problem of negative debt cycles 
is persistent. Because they turn to credit when faced with unexpected 
expenses—and unexpected expenses are not limited, onetime 
occurrences—it is likely that old adverse information would simply be 
replaced with new adverse information. When living paycheck to 
paycheck, it would be unrealistic to think that shock events are a one-
time thing. Thus, while this measure may improve credit reports and 
scores to some degree, negative credit histories would likely persist for 
many struggling parents. 
Second, limited reporting of default on financial products that the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) deems unsafe may 
result in improved credit scores and histories for families like some of 
the respondents in this study. However, the degree to which it would 
help would depend on which products were included in the “unsafe” 
category. Many of the families interviewed did not, at least initially, use 
credit measures such as payday loans or title loans. Most respondents 
started with credit cards, which seemed to have fairly standard terms. 
The problems for the families began almost immediately after a 
financial shock because they were almost always living paycheck to 
paycheck, as over half of all Americans do.238  
When a shock hit, respondents used a credit card to cover the 
budget gap, and then interest and fees built up, so that even if the initial 
shock was relatively small, the resulting cycle of debt, interest, and fees 
became almost inescapable. Once they found themselves holding this 
credit card debt, they often did not pay it off immediately because rent, 
utilities, and food—payments that are associated with basic needs and 
daily survival—took precedence.239 Credit card debt, even if it has 
higher interest rates, does not take priority, and thus interest and fees 
accumulate and credit histories suffer. And so the cycle continues. 
 
 238. See The Role of Emergency Savings in Family Financial Security: What Resources Do 
Families Have for Financial Emergencies?, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 2, 6 (Nov. 2015), 
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perma.cc/2YBN-JTCE]. 
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Since the CFPB would be unlikely to deem most credit cards “unsafe” 
financial products, this proposed measure would have some benefits 
for families like the respondents in this study, but would be unlikely to 
change their financial trajectories significantly.  
Finally, there is no doubt that medical issues were the culprits 
spurring negative debt cycles for some respondents. For those with 
significant medical issues, the proposal to ban medical debt on credit 
reports would likely help. However, many respondents described 
dental issues—which are not covered by insurance, but instead put on 
credit cards—and work days missed for relatively minor medical 
problems. The medical debt proposal is one that would likely help 
some respondents, but it is not broad enough to cover the plethora of 
issues beyond major medical problems that trigger downward financial 
trajectories and credit history problems. 
Ultimately, though the measures proposed above would certainly 
help some of the parents I interviewed, many parents would still suffer 
from negative credit histories and the associated collateral 
consequences. This is in part because none of the measures address the 
circumstances that lead to negative credit histories in the first place. 
B. Helping Families Manage Unexpected Emergencies 
1. Insurance-Based Plans.  There are several insurance-based 
proposals designed to help families weather financial shocks. Jacob 
Hacker, for example, has proposed a “Universal Insurance” program 
that is designed to “provide short-term, stop-loss protection to 
qualifying families whose income suddenly declined by 20 percent or 
more, or whose out-of-pocket health costs in one year amounted to 20 
percent or more of their combined income for that year.”240 Hacker’s 
program focuses on “particularly dramatic cases.”241 The program 
would pay out short-term benefits in cases of unemployment, disability, 
illness, catastrophic health costs, and death of a family breadwinner.242 
This program could help save families who suffer from these 
catastrophic problems from financial ruin. However, it is not designed 
to deal with some of the seemingly small financial shocks like car 
repairs and dental emergencies that can still result in significant 
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financial problems over time. 
Anne Alstott has proposed another important insurance-based 
program, Life-Planning Insurance, which would similarly benefit some 
of the respondents in this study. The plan calls for social services and 
income support for parents whose children “require intensive, personal 
care due to a serious illness or disability.”243 Alstott’s program would 
be a significant step forward for struggling families, but it is only meant 
for families with children with major medical needs. Like Hacker’s 
program, it addresses an important sub-set of struggling families, but is 
not meant to address the seemingly small financial shocks that can lead 
families to a downward financial trajectory. 
2. Savings-Based Plans.  The need for emergency savings has not 
been lost on scholars, and there have been several plans, including one 
of my own, that propose ways to enhance such savings.244 Most of these 
proposals are meant to help financially vulnerable families save funds 
for a rainy day.245 There are many different types of proposals. For 
example, some programs focus on tax-based savings plans,246 whereas 
others involve measures that incentivize families to put some of their 
income into savings accounts.247 
Successfully executed, these programs can help families have the 
money needed to cover small financial emergencies. However, 
historically, the take-up rates for savings programs have been relatively 
low. For example, Start2Save, a program designed to help low-income 
families build emergency savings, was piloted in collaboration with 
several community-based agencies that serve low-income and low-
asset clients.248 The savings goal for participants was $500 over a one to 
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two year period, with deposits between $20 and $40 each month.249 
Only 35 percent of those who attended a Start2Save information 
session ended up enrolling.250 The Start2Save researchers found that 
this was due to “a host of issues, financial, behavioral, and emotional,” 
which all affected the decision to enroll.251 Further, of those who did 
enroll, less than 20 percent signed up for automatic deposit, which fell 
short of the program’s 60 percent goal. Enrollees who successfully 
completed the program missed three out of ten deposits, while those 
who dropped out or were terminated missed, on average, six out of ten 
payments.252 
Though savings programs can play an important role for some 
families on the road to financial stability, research shows that one of 
the key reasons low-income families have significantly less in savings 
than higher income families is because they lack disposable income.253 
For 25 percent of adults who work full-time, the situation is even more 
dire and they do not make enough money to meet the basic needs of 
their families.254 For these families, contributing to a savings plan is not 
possible, and indeed, potentially unwise. Thus, this Article proposes a 
more comprehensive program aimed at serving more families. 
3. Postal Banking and Other Financial Services.  Postal banking 
started in Great Britain in 1861.255 Its adoption by the United States 
has been proposed at different points in U.S. history, starting in 1871.256 
At times, the U.S. Postal Service has actually performed financial 
services work, such as selling money orders and prepaid American 
Express debit cards.257 The rationale behind proposals for postal 
banking is that it is both a way to revitalize the postal service and a way 
to provide financial services to the unbanked.258 Some of the proposals 
recommend that the post office function as a bank; others call for the 
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post office to provide financial services that traditional banks do not 
generally provide to underserved communities, such as small loans, 
debit-type cards with money preloaded on them, and savings programs. 
Depending on how exactly postal banking is implemented, it could 
certainly provide short-term help to some families, such as those who 
need a small loan to cover an unexpected expense or a safe place to 
keep savings. However, as proposed, postal banking does not provide 
financial planning and social service oriented help that many families 
need to create a long-term plan for financial resilience. Further, for 
families living paycheck to paycheck, even the low interest rates 
proposed for small loans would be prohibitive and eventually result in 
owing debt to the government. A more comprehensive program could 
take some of the positive features of postal banking, but create a 
program that would help a larger swath of families plan and maintain 
financial stability. 
C. Proposals for Providing Direct Cash Benefits to Struggling 
Families 
1. Universal Basic Income, Universal Child Allowance, and Other 
Cash-Based Programs.  Several proposals to provide cash in the form 
of a universal monthly subsidy have received attention in the popular 
press.259 These proposals vary in specifics, but the general idea is that 
the government would provide all citizens with a set amount of money 
on a regular basis, which would lift recipients above the poverty line. 
The money would not be tied to work or other requirements; instead, 
it would be universal, with no restrictions on who receives it or how the 
money is spent.260 The idea behind a universal child allowance is the 
same, but the funds would be provided only to people who have 
children under the age of eighteen and would vary based on the 
 
 259. See, e.g., Clio Chang, Why Democrats Must Embrace a Universal Child Allowance, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Mar. 21, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/131784/democrats-must-embrace-
universal-child-allowance [https://perma.cc/N4GM-7HTN]; Patrick Gillespie, Mark Zuckerberg 
Supports Universal Basic Income. What Is It?, CNN:MONEY (May 26, 2017, 2:24 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2017/05/26/news/economy/mark-zuckerberg-universal-basic-income/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/LCJ5-MMNP]; James Surowiecki, The Case for Free Money, NEW YORKER 
(June 20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-
basic-income [https://perma.cc/9LHB-J7U5]. 
 260. Christine Emba, Universal Basic Income, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2015) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/28/universal-basic-income-a-
primer/?utm_term=.d72ada2fea10 [https://perma.cc/3AFA-J65N] (detailing the specifics of a 
universal basic income). 
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number of children that an individual claims.261 
The debate about the practicality and utility of such programs is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Without deep analysis, it appears that 
because most of the respondents in this study were struggling to make 
ends meet, an increase in their monthly income would certainly provide 
them some help. However, particularly because the programs are 
designed such that the benefits diminish (through taxes) as incomes 
increase, many families in financial situations similar to the 
respondents in this study may only see slight benefits from such 
programs. Unless the increased income from the subsidies was 
substantial enough that it could lead to meaningful savings, families 
would still struggle when they experienced financial emergencies 
because they would not have access to money to cover the emergency 
right away. 
2. Increasing Funding for TANF, Food Stamps, and Other Public 
Benefits.  Some researchers and advocates argue for increasing the 
amount of resources devoted to programs such as TANF,262 the 
EITC,263 and housing subsidies.264 Increasing the cash benefits available 
through TANF would certainly help some families who are struggling 
financially. However, it would do little for families who do not qualify 
for TANF due to income or other factors, and it would also do little for 
the families who have invoked a self-sufficiency narrative and thus are 
unwilling to seek out TANF when they are in financial distress. 
Further, for families who were willing to apply for TANF and did 
qualify, the application and waiting period might be too long for them 
to wait with no other help, and they may end up turning to credit to 
 
 261. URBAN INST., PowerPoint Presentation, A Universal Child Allowance to Reduce 
Poverty and Improve Child Development, http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/presentation 
_slides__a_universal_child_allowance_to_reduce_poverty_and_improve_child_development.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2X6-VMHF]. 
 262. See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti, How To Improve TANF, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (July 15, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-15-15tanf-
testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLB2-JWDA].  
 263. See, e.g., Jason Furman, Tax Reform and Poverty, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
8–9 (Apr. 10, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-10-06tax.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L3HH-H2DG] (proposing to expand the EITC for larger families); Tim Worstall, Don’t 
Increase the Minimum Wage, Raise the EITC Instead, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2015, 10:17 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/01/10/dont-increase-the-minimum-wage-raise-
the-eitc-instead/#6c265ebf7a49 [https://perma.cc/UFL4-HPTT]. 
 264. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED 307–08 (2016); Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable 
America: Poverty, Housing and Eviction, FAST FOCUS 5 (Mar. 2015), https:// 
www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/fastfocus/pdfs/FF22-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR3A-NKPP].  
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cover expenses during the wait. 
Similar to other tax subsidies, increasing the amount of money 
families receive through the EITC may help some families with long-
term savings goals, particularly if the increase is substantial. However, 
for families who are unable to save their refund, an increased EITC 
subsidy would be unlikely to help them weather financial emergencies 
because the EITC comes only once a year at tax time.265 Finally, for 
families living paycheck to paycheck but whose providers have steady 
jobs with incomes above the EITC threshold, an increase in EITC 
subsidy would not help build financial resilience. 
Increased housing subsidies might help families who qualify, but 
like other public benefits programs, such subsidies provide no help at 
all for families who make just above the income threshold. 
Furthermore, if a family applied for a housing subsidy after a financial 
emergency already occurred, the waiting period might be so long that 
the family would have to use credit to cover expenses until the subsidy 
came through. Finally, for families who were already receiving a 
subsidy at the time of an emergency, it is unlikely the subsidy would 
have been designed to allow the family to accumulate enough savings 
to cover the emergency because there are often very low asset limits to 
qualify for such subsidy programs. 
Ultimately, the proposals to increase benefits for struggling 
families could potentially improve the financial trajectories of 
qualifying families. What is less clear, however, is whether these 
programs would ultimately help families avoid negative debt cycles 
when they have to cover an unexpected expense. This is particularly an 
issue for families who do not qualify for these programs based on their 
income during times of stability and for families who are unwilling to 
seek out help from public benefit programs during tough economic 
stretches. 
V.  A NEW SAFETY NET: FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR FAMILY 
SECURITY 
The new safety net program I propose in this Article is developed 
based on what existing data already tell us about the precarious 
financial situation of low-income families, and is then further informed 
by the data collected for this Article. Existing research indicates that 
the financial instability displayed by many of the respondents in this 
 
 265. See generally Greene, supra note 15 (suggesting a new way to redistribute to the EITC). 
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study is not unusual. Indeed, low-income families are particularly 
vulnerable to financial instability, including substantial income 
declines of 50 percent or more.266 Further, low-income households have 
savings levels that are substantially lower than those at higher income 
levels.267 We also know that low-income families are using credit cards 
at rates similar to those of higher-income households,268 and that debt 
levels of families with children have increased since the 1980s.269 
When it comes to financial emergencies, not surprisingly, 
households with the lowest incomes are least able to cope.270 However, 
it is not just those with the lowest incomes that struggle to cover 
financial emergencies. One study found that less than a quarter of all 
U.S. households have enough savings to meet an appropriate three-
month emergency savings benchmark.271 Another study that uses the 
ability to come up with $2,000 as a benchmark for emergency savings 
found that about half of all U.S. households could not come up with 
$2,000 in one month.272 In this study, poor and low-income households 
were found to be even worse off. Among households with income 
below $20,000, less than one-quarter—23 percent, to be precise—could 
meet the $2,000 mark, and among households with incomes between 
$20,000 and $30,000, only one-third could do so.273 
So where do families who are struggling financially turn when they 
experience an unexpected financial shock? Existing research tells us 
that, consistent with the respondents in this study, low-income 
households are susceptible to turning to credit when an emergency hits 
 
 266. See Collins, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 267. Leah Gjertson, Liquid Savings Patterns and Credit Usage Among the Poor, in A FRAGILE 
BALANCE: EMERGENCY SAVINGS AND LIQUID RESOURCES FOR LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS, 
supra note 20, at 17, 19–20 (describing studies that estimate the appropriate benchmark for 
emergency savings). 
 268. Mann, supra note 20, at 257–78. 
 269. Yumiko Aratani & Michelle Chou, ASSET POVERTY AND DEBT AMONG FAMILIES WITH 
CHILDREN, NATL’L CTR. FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY 3 (2010), https://www.nccp.org/publications/
pdf/text_918.pd =f [https://perma.cc/DH69-XJ3N].  
 270. Gjertson, supra note 267, at 33 (“Households with the lowest income are least prepared 
to cope with a financial emergency by any measure.”); See also Report on the Economic Well-
Being of U.S. Households in 2016, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 2 (May 2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-report-economic-well-being-us-households-2017
05.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK9Q-NLVT] (finding that 44 percent of adults say they either could not 
come up with $400 to cover the cost of an emergency expense or would covering it by borrowing 
money or selling something).  
 271. Gjertson, supra note 267, at 18–20. 
 272. Lusardi et al., supra note 15, at 83; Gjertson, supra note 267, at 20.  
 273. Gjertson, supra note 267, at 20.  
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because they rarely have savings available to cover the emergency.274 
TANF, on the other hand, is under enrolled. The take-up rate of TANF 
is only 30.7 percent, meaning that 69.3 percent of families who qualify 
for TANF are not receiving it.275 This is consistent with the resistance 
to applying for TANF that was displayed by many respondents in this 
Article’s study. 
This qualitative data from this study help unveil the mechanisms 
behind the existing data. Part of the reason take-up rates for public 
benefits programs like TANF might be so low is that some parents 
develop narratives of self-sufficiency—narratives consistent with the 
culture promoted by welfare reform. These parents behave in ways 
consistent with this narrative, which includes avoiding TANF, even 
when pursuing public benefits might seem otherwise rational. Instead, 
parents turn to credit, which for many of them results in a downward 
financial trajectory. 
So how might an effective program aimed at promoting financial 
resilience be designed? This study’s data suggest that establishing a 
program that encourages self-sufficiency, but also encourages families 
to actually seek help from the program, requires the program to be 
designed so that utilizing it is consistent with a self-sufficiency 
narrative. This Article’s proposed program, Financial Services for 
Family Stability (FSFS), would use some TANF block grant funds to 
create a government-funded financial planning and services 
program.276 The services from this program would seek to fill the role 
 
 274. Collins, supra note 20, at 2–5 (discussing the need for low-income families to turn to 
credit when they experience financial emergencies and discussing other studies that find that 
families take on debt following a health difficulty); Gjertson, supra note 267, at 28 (“[P]eople who 
lack liquidity as savings appear likely to turn to credit as a substitute.”); see also Greene, supra 
note 15, at 547–52 (documenting the use of credit cards among low-income respondents who 
experienced financial difficulties); Mann, supra note 20, at 257–78 (providing detailed data about 
patterns of credit card use among low- and moderate-income households). 
 275. Crouse & Macartney, supra note 176, at 20. 
 276. The program would not necessarily replace TANF and all other public benefits 
programs; instead, it would likely serve somewhat different needs and different people. As 
Kathryn Edin and Luke Shaefer have studied, there are some families living continuously in deep 
poverty—on less than $2.00 a day, per person, post welfare reform. See generally EDIN & 
SHAEFER, supra note 1 (studying families living in deep poverty). Many of the parents in Edin 
and Shaefer’s study have underlying needs that differ from the group of parents I interviewed, 
and TANF or other alternative programs may be most appropriate for them. See id. at xxiv (“But 
there will always be circumstances in which work as a primary approach to alleviating poverty 
won’t work. In those cases, we need a system that truly acts as a safety net for families in crisis, 
catching them when they fall.”). The FSFS program is meant primary for families whose parents 
have been able to find relatively stable jobs and acquire the skills necessary to work, but whose 
income and circumstances of living paycheck to paycheck put them at great risk for downward 
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that credit card companies and debt settlement companies currently 
serve. The program would help families develop financial resilience 
and avoid the cost and consequences of turning to credit as their safety 
net, while allowing them to continue on largely self-sufficient paths. 
Several of the core features of FSFS would be based on a program 
in Ireland called the Money Advice and Budgeting Service (MABS).277 
MABS is a government-run program that bills itself as a money and 
debt advice service. The program is completely free of charge and 
independent, with no connection to any bank or credit union.278 MABS 
operates over sixty offices around Ireland and works with “people who 
may be struggling with debt or who need help in managing their 
money.”279 MABS employs people called Money Advisers and 
Administrators. MABS staff are trained and skilled in “all aspects of 
debt and money management, as well as in skills relating to supporting 
people through times of crisis.”280 The user handbook for MABS says, 
“[m]ost of all, MABS staff are compassionate, caring and non-
judgmental. We believe that it is possible to give a highly professional 
service in a caring manner.”281 MABS also advertises its services and 
encourages citizens to contact them for help, a very different model 
from TANF.282 Indeed, the MABS Guide says, “[t]alk to MABS—
make contact early, don’t delay.”283 
Just as I would recommend for any major policy transformation, 
FSFS programs should be piloted in diverse areas around the country 
 
mobility if just one unexpected emergency arises. 
 277. There are only a few evaluations of MABS publicly available. See Olive McCarthy, 
Caoilfhionn Lane & Noreen Byrne, Ctr. for Coop. Studies, Univ. Coll. Cork, Cork MABS Study: 
Clients’ Experiences, Opinions and Satisfaction Levels, MONEY ADVICE & BUDGETING SERV. 2, 
2 (Nov. 2013), https://www.mabs.ie/downloads/reports_submissions/CORK_MABS_ 
RESEARCH_STUDY.pdf [https://perma.cc/G63R-JQWB]. However, those that are available 
report promising results. One study on the impact of debt advice found that MABS had “a very 
positive impact on helping people to cope with crisis debt, enabling people to repay their creditors 
and to manage their money.” Id. Another study of client satisfaction with the MABS program 
found that overall, 80% of MABS clients were very satisfied with the program and almost 95% 
of clients were satisfied or very satisfied with the program. Id. at 13. 
 278. Using the Money Advice and Budgeting Service: Your Guide, MONEY ADVICE & 
BUDGETING SERV. 2 (2016), https://www.mabs.ie/downloads/publications/16_05_18_Using_ 
MABS_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/A29E-YFRG]. 
 279. Id.  
 280. Id. at 5.  
 281. Id.  
 282. See EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at 169–70 (describing evidence of how applicants are 
diverted from applying for aid through TANF, sometimes in unauthorized ways).  
 283. Using the Money Advice and Budgeting Service: Your Guide, supra note 278, at 3.  
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before the program is implemented widely. Rural, urban, and suburban 
areas with varying costs of living should be included in the pilot 
programs. This would help those implementing the program determine 
what is working and what might need to be adjusted and improved. 
These pilot programs could vary different aspects of the FSFS 
programs and test both short-term and long-term outcomes. For 
example, some people could receive no-interest small loans, and some 
people could receive very low-interest small loans. The key enduring 
features of FSFS are discussed in more detail below. 
A. Financial Planning/Advising 
Financial literacy is low in the United States,284 and financial 
education is virtually non-existent.285 Despite, or perhaps in light of, 
this lack of knowledge, Americans want financial planning help. The 
budget and financial-planning industry makes private actors like 
financial motivational speaker Dave Ramsey millions of dollars each 
year—people attend his seminars, buy his books, subscribe to his 
website, and listen to his radio show.286 You Need a Budget (YNAB) 
budgeting software is also popular, as are other programs in the same 
vein.287 Consistent with the popularity of these programs, the 
respondents in this study expressed a desire for financial-planning help. 
At the end of every interview I conducted, I asked each respondent if 
they had any questions or if there was anything else they wanted to 
know. Many respondents answered by asking me if I knew someone 
who could help them with their money or organizing their finances. 
One respondent, Denay, said, “I want to know how I can afford one of 
those rich people estate planners. You know, someone to sort this out 
for me! I’m just kidding, girlfriend. But it would help.” Another 
respondent, Nicki, asked whether I knew of “any free financial 
planning people.” FSFS would seek to respond to this need. 
Similar to the MABS Money Advisers and Administrators 
 
 284. Madeline Farber, Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Can’t Pass a Basic Test of Financial 
Literacy, FORTUNE (July 12, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/12/financial-literacy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5A8P-6QQL]. 
 285. Id.  
 286. Joe Weisenthal, Christian Get-Out-Of-Debt Guru is Richer than God, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 9, 2009, 3:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/christian-get-out-of-debt-guru-is-richer-
than-god-2009-9 [https://perma.cc/43R7-MHFE]. 
 287. See, e.g., MINT, https://www.mint.com/ [https://perma.cc/H5ZD-PT9D]; You Need a 
Budget, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You_Need_a_Budget [https://perma.cc/53HJ-
ZPYD]. 
GREENE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  11:44 AM 
302  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:233 
discussed previously, FSFS would employ people called financial 
planners, a title conforming to the professional title used by private 
companies who provide financial planning services in the United 
States. FSFS would present itself as a professional organization whose 
goal is client satisfaction, mirroring private financial planning service 
companies. FSFS would also seek to model the service-oriented 
institutional culture of the MABS program. This culture would be in 
direct contrast to the generally unhelpful reputation welfare offices 
have with recipients.288 
FSFS clients would be asked to bring certain documents to their 
first meeting, including all paperwork on debts, such as any notices, 
judgments, or court paperwork; income tax returns; and paperwork 
related to household spending, such as receipts and credit card bills. 
The exact type of advice given by FSFS financial planners would 
depend on the needs of individual clients, but the overarching goals 
would be similar to those of MABS: to support clients in finding a 
solution to their debt problems, and to develop client skills to allow 
them to have better control over their money.289 An added goal of FSFS 
would be to help clients in acute situations find solutions that do not 
include high-interest loans or credit. More specifically, financial 
planners would help clients figure out how much money they need to 
cover their expenses and where they may be able to cut costs. Financial 
planners would provide both general advice on budgeting and a 
detailed budgeting plan, as well as help clients figure out which debts 
should be given the highest priority for repayment. 
Other services could include helping clients objectively evaluate 
the payoff of options for higher education. For example, financial 
planners could provide guidance about some of the pitfalls of for-profit 
college programs.290 They could also help people develop a sustainable 
budget for paying off student loans. 
Staffing would need to be such that wait times are relatively 
short—a meeting with a financial counselor should happen within two 
weeks of the initial request. A wait time of about two weeks would 
 
 288. See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE 110–12 (2011) (describing the lack 
of help and information many welfare recipients experienced when contacting or visiting the 
welfare office). 
 289. Using the Money Advice and Budgeting Service: Your Guide, supra note 278, at 9.  
 290. For a description of the pitfalls of for-profit colleges for students who enroll, see 
generally Alia Wong, The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges, ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-downfall-of-for-profit-colleges/385810/ 
[https://perma.cc/RF2Z-3XE6].  
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allow people to gather the necessary documents for the first meeting, 
but would be timely enough to ensure that people who are at risk for 
financial catastrophe are able to get the help they need. The two-week 
wait period could be waived for some people through the initial use of 
the financial emergency crisis counseling line, discussed in Section D 
below. Further, FSFS should offer flexible appointment times outside 
of the typical nine-to-five workday so that people do not have to take 
off work to seek help.  
Finally, in addition to the advice from financial advisers, FSFS 
would have a comprehensive website providing self-help material, such 
as steps to take in order to negotiate with creditors, budgeting tools, 
and other money-management resources. A common complaint 
among respondents in this study was that they did not know who to 
trust when it came to financial advice. FSFS would be a go-to source 
for reliable, impartial, information. 
B. Debt Management Services 
Though the overall goal of FSFS would be to help clients avoid 
owing substantial debt and falling into negative debt cycles, inevitably 
a share of its clients would be people who are seeking help because 
they are drowning in debt. This would be particularly true in the early 
years of FSFS, before the financial planning services would be able to 
catch people and help them avoid significant debt. 
FSFS would have several programs designed to help people in 
debt that would serve as alternatives to bankruptcy. These programs 
would also be meant to replace debt consolidation and settlements 
services, but designed to appeal to consumers who are seeking out such 
services with the hope of avoiding bankruptcy. 
One of the programs would be modeled on a MABS program. 
MABS has an agreement protocol with several creditors. These 
creditors have agreed to help customers address their debt problems 
and to develop repayment plans with them. The protocols allow for 
some debt to be written off,291 and other debt to be repaid over time, in 
some cases without interest continuing to accumulate. FSFS would 
adopt a similar protocol plan with creditors. 
The debt protocol plans would provide both creditors and debtors 
some benefits over bankruptcy. For creditors, the incentive to join the 
 
 291. Money Advice and Budgeting Services, CITIZENS INFO. BOARD., http:// 
www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/personal_finance/debt/mabs_service.html#l536d 
[https://perma.cc/BA7U-SM8W]. 
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protocol program would be that the repayment plans would net them 
more money than Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
most debts are discharged, so creditors can come out with nothing. For 
debtors, FSFS plans would not be reported on a credit report as a 
bankruptcy and would offer a more personalized solution to debt. By 
developing protocol plans with a cushion for unexpected expenses as 
well as flexibility to adjust the plans if clients’ circumstances change, 
FSFS financial advisers would ensure that protocol plans developed for 
their clients were financially feasible—avoiding the problematic 
rigidity of obligations under Chapter 13 bankruptcy for debtors.292 
Additionally, because FSFS would not provide clients with the funds 
to repay these debts, clients who have adopted a self-sufficiency 
narrative should not have concerns that they are receiving a 
government handout by enrolling in the program. 
FSFS might also develop partnerships with local lawyers. In some 
cases, clients may be referred to these lawyers in order to deal with 
debt judgments or situations in which FSFS feels bankruptcy would be 
the most beneficial option for the client and is able to convince the 
client to consider bankruptcy.  
C. No-Interest Small Loans 
The availability of emergency funds at the time of a financial shock 
can go a long way in preventing a costly, major, downward financial 
spiral.293 FSFS would have a program allowing anyone to take out a 
loan for $2,000 or less. Before taking out the loan, clients would be 
required to meet with a FSFS counselor and discuss the need for the 
loan and its intended uses, though no formal documentation would be 
required. The counselor would determine a repayment plan based on 
the individual circumstances of each client. The loans would be 
interest-free, but any additional loan amount taken out during the 
repayment of a prior loan would be limited such that the borrower did 
not have more than $2,000 total in loans withdrawn at any given time. 
Recipients would be encouraged to borrow the minimum amount of 
 
 292. See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 262–65 (2015) 
(discussing the fact that bankruptcy does not provide flexibility for changed circumstances and 
noting that changed circumstances are a reason many people repeatedly file Chapter 13 
bankruptcy).  
 293. See Sharon Henderson, Prosperity SmartSave Card, in A FRAGILE BALANCE: 
EMERGENCY SAVINGS AND LIQUID RESOURCES FOR LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS, supra note 20, 
at 141, 144; Jonathan Mintz, The SaveUSA Coalition, in A FRAGILE BALANCE: EMERGENCY 
SAVINGS AND LIQUID RESOURCES FOR LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS, supra note 20, at 75, 76. 
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money needed. 
Clients would still be able to access all other FSFS services if they 
had defaulted on a FSFS loan. FSFS’s budget would be based on the 
assumption that a majority of the loans would not be fully paid back. 
The exact rules for the small loans should be subjected to pilot studies, 
with variations of no- and very low-interest rates as well as differing 
rules about repayment. Significantly, FSFS loans would not appear on 
credit reports and would not be subject to garnishment through taxes 
or wages. The incentive structure for paying back the loans would be 
that, once repaid, more short-term, no- or low-interest loans would be 
available. 
Because these loans would be available to everyone irrespective 
of income, and would require repayment, they likely would not come 
with the same stigma as accepting public benefits. The terms of the loan 
would look more like a financial transaction than a handout. 
D. Financial Emergency Crisis Counseling 
FSFS would have a telephone helpline separate from their general 
information and scheduling phone number that would offer immediate 
advice for people in emergency financial situations. These crisis 
counselors would have a somewhat different role than the financial 
planners working in FSFS field offices. The counselors, who would 
specialize in specific geographical areas, would have a variety of 
resources and tools at their disposal; by pointing clients toward 
available resources in real time, counselors might help callers avoid 
triggering a downward financial spiral. For instance, counselors would 
be plugged into local resources outside of FSFS that may be able to 
provide short-term child care solutions, emergency car rides, and other 
such temporary help. Additionally, crisis counselors could help clients 
gain access to small loans in a timely matter and would make 
recommendations about how to most effectively use the money. 
This program could be particularly effective in reducing negative 
debt cycles spurred by seemingly small, unexpected expenses that 
clients might face. For example, several respondents in this study 
described negative debt cycles spurred by the need for car repairs. 
Without their car, they were unable to get to work. If such a client 
called the FSFS emergency line, the counselor could help the client by 
figuring out what types of help may be available. The counselor might 
suggest the client take out a small loan from FSFS that would cover not 
only the car repair cost, but also the cost of mass transit or a ride service 
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to get to work during the time the car was being repaired. This plan 
would minimize the financial impact on the client because the client 
would not have to miss work. If the need for a car repair is dealt with 
swiftly, alternative transportation would likely only need to be 
provided for a few days, at most. The counselor would then refer the 
client to an FSFS financial advisor to help the client come up with a 
plan to repay the small loan. 
E. Other Considerations 
There are of course several aspects of the FSFS program that 
would need to be further analyzed and decided. Funding is a key issue, 
and an analysis of the exact cost of the program would need to be 
conducted. Funding for FSFS could come, at least in part, from TANF 
block grant funds. As previously discussed, states use only an average 
of about 25 percent of TANF funding for basic cash assistance.294 Other 
TANF block grant funds go toward programs that have a questionable 
relationship to TANF’s goals, such as state child welfare systems. The 
federal government could require or incentivize states to begin using 
some percentage of TANF block grant funds to fund FSFS programs, 
perhaps even at rates as high as 50 percent. 
FSFS would also need to find physical buildings to house its 
programs, and cost would certainly factor into this decision. Using 
existing public benefit program offices would not be advisable because 
of the negative association of those spaces for many potential clients. 
This could potentially cause people who adhere to a self-sufficiency 
narrative to avoid FSFS. Some options for existing physical space 
include post offices, libraries, and possibly even schools. Census data 
would be used to decide on strategic placement of FSFS offices in order 
to make sure the offices are located in neighborhoods of high need. 
Policymakers would also have to pay attention to the wording and 
implications of FSFS legislation in order to protect clients. Care would 
have to be taken to ensure that FSFS loans were not reportable or 
accessible to credit reporting companies. Further, the program should 
be designed so that money from FSFS loans is not taxable and does not 
count as an asset for purposes of qualifying for other public benefit 
programs. 
Several other technicalities of service and delivery would also have 
to be further pursued. Officials would have to develop a secure way to 
 
 294. See supra Figure 1; supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
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release the loan money quickly and efficiently, to receive repayment, 
and to track repayment. Additionally, officials would have to 
determine the appropriate wait time for FSFS services and staff the 
program accordingly, with flexibility to increase staffing as FSFS 
services become more popular. As discussed above, the goal should be 
a wait time of approximately two weeks for an in-person meeting.  
Finally, FSFS would also have to publish very clear guidelines 
about the types of problems that fall under its umbrella. For example, 
FSFS would not advise on business debt or other business-related 
financial problems. However, it would help business owners address 
personal debts.295 
F. Potential Counterarguments to FSFS Proposal 
1. FSFS Services Will Not Work for the Very Poor and Perpetually 
Unemployed.  The FSFS program will not solve poverty on its own, and 
it is not meant to be a comprehensive social service program. FSFS 
would fill a specific safety net hole that is currently left open by existing 
public programs. FSFS programs may not help everyone, and they may 
have less utility for the very poor who have no job and no prospect of 
a job. Research by Kathryn Edin and Luke Shaefer reveals that, post-
welfare reform, there are some families living on less than $2.00 a day 
per person.296 Many of these parents have underlying needs that are 
different from the group of parents I interviewed for this study. TANF-
like programs or programs that focus on job training may be most 
appropriate for parents like those studied by Edin and Shaefer.297 
2. FSFS Will Be Very Expensive.  There is no doubt that the FSFS 
program will require a substantial budget. While a true analysis of the 
program’s cost is well beyond the scope of this Article, there are some 
important factors to consider. First, if states are required or 
incentivized to devote some portion of their TANF block grant funds 
to FSFS, the additional funds needed to develop and support the 
program would be substantially reduced. 
Second, it is very expensive to house the homeless, and significant 
funds are put toward upward mobility programs every year. Indeed, as 
 
 295. Using the Money and Budgeting Service: Your Guide, supra note 278, at 2. 
 296. See EDIN & SHAEFER, supra note 1, at xvii. 
 297. See id. at xxiv. (“But there will always be circumstances in which work as a primary 
approach to alleviating poverty won’t work. In those cases, we need a system that truly acts as a 
safety net for families in crisis, catching them when they fall.”). 
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Jonathan Mintz noted, “In most cities, low- to moderate-income (LMI) 
households are the primary users of municipal social services, including 
workforce development and homelessness prevention programs, 
among others. But the progress gained through a social service 
intervention can be wiped out by the lack of fundamental financial 
stability.”298 As Mintz further notes, the lack of just a relatively small 
amount of money—say, $500 to pay for a car repair—could result in 
the loss of a day’s pay or the loss of a job.299 Once a family is jobless, 
we can assume that the risk of eventual need for expensive social 
services goes up. We learned from the respondents in this Article’s 
study that the risk is particularly high for people who are unwilling to 
seek help from social services immediately. They may eventually be 
evicted and need social services that add up to much more than the 
government would have spent on a no-interest $500 loan. 
Finally, there is no doubt that making FSFS a universally available 
program increases the cost. After careful analysis, if the cost appears 
too great, this facet of the program can potentially be reexamined. 
3. A Program Similar to FSFS Could Be Run Through TANF.  
Some states have enacted emergency fund programs as part of their 
TANF programs. For example, North Carolina’s TANF program 
includes Work First Cash Assistance, which is designed to help families 
who are experiencing short-term financial problems.300 To divert 
parents away from traditional TANF enrollment, Work First Cash 
Assistance grants temporary aid in the form of cash or assistance with 
housing or utility expenses for a period of up to three months.301 
However, the North Carolina temporary assistance program and 
others like it provide just a small fraction of the services that FSFS 
would make available. Unlike FSFS, the current state programs are not 
designed to help families with long-term financial planning and 
stability. More importantly, programs run through TANF are unlikely 
to be effective for people who have embraced the self-sufficiency 
narrative because those individuals are reluctant to utilize what might 
be perceived as traditional public assistance, a problem that FSFS is 
structured to avoid. However, as discussed above, I do suggest that 
 
 298. Mintz, supra note 293, at 75.  
 299. Id.  
 300. Work First Cash Assistance, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.
ncdhhs.gov/assistance/low-income-services/work-first-cash-assistance [https://perma.cc/ L69Z-
JEDD]. 
 301. Id.  
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states use some of their TANF funding to support FSFS, a cause much 
closer to the original goals of TANF than programs many states current 
use TANF sources to fund. 
4. People Will Take Advantage of the Small-Loan Programs.  The 
small loan program would be intentionally designed to minimize 
bureaucratic red tape. Applicants would have to present identification 
and verifiable contact information, but there would be no requirement 
to document hardship or need. As the stories of respondents in this 
Article demonstrate, the need for emergency funds is often extremely 
dire. If there was a lengthy application process or a requirement to 
justify need (as there is with most other public benefits), the waiting 
period would often counteract the very purpose of the loans. It would 
simply be too late. 
One important concern is that people may take advantage of the 
program, borrowing money with no intention to return it. In some 
cases, they might use the money for illicit purposes. There is no doubt 
that this concern might prove true of some percent of loan recipients, 
and the pilot programs should monitor this issue. If the problem turns 
out to be significant, some demonstration of need may be required, or 
some requirement of providing receipts for how the money was spent 
may need to be imposed. Alternatively, instead of providing the money 
in loan form, the program could provide the money directly to 
whatever service provider the borrower identifies. This could include a 
landlord, car repair shop, dentist, child care provider, or supermarket. 
Another option would be to distribute the money on preloaded cards, 
track the use of the money, and specify the uses that are not allowed. 
Ultimately, the pilot program results would be important in 
determining the best design to minimize abuse of the program. 
5. FSFS Would Be Better Run Through Private Bank Partnerships 
Than by the Government.  Partnerships with private banks and 
financial advising businesses could certainly be explored. Indeed, from 
a political feasibility perspective, such partnerships may increase 
community buy-in and ultimately help FSFS garner political support 
and sustainability. The concern with such partnerships, however, is that 
many low-income families have had negative experiences with private 
banks and do not trust them.302 Thus, when families see that the 
 
 302. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & VICTOR TAN CHEN, THE MISSING CLASS: PORTRAITS 
OF THE NEAR POOR IN AMERICA 173–74 (2007) (explaining that many low-income families, do 
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program is run through private banks, take-up rates might suffer 
because of families’ concerns about whether to trust the program and 
the information provided to them. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates the importance of conducting research 
that allows us to explore the mechanisms behind how people 
understand and experience structural conditions and changes, and how 
these understandings become determinants of behavior. We knew 
from existing research that the financial insecurity of low-income 
families was increasing, that they increasingly relied on credit, and that 
take-up rates of TANF were low. The findings from this study help 
explain this existing data. We learned that the features of the post-
welfare reform safety net interact with the narratives that families have 
created in potentially perverse ways. Those families who have adopted 
the very self-sufficiency narratives welfare reformers hoped would lead 
to financial independence and security are instead particularly at risk 
when they experience an unexpected emergency. 
This type of in-depth interview work is vital to understanding the 
connection between law, inequality, and poverty. When assumptions 
are made about how people have or will respond to policy changes 
without exploring the reasons and patterns of their behavior, 
inefficient and troubling policy formations can result. In this case, a key 
bipartisan reason for reforming welfare was that it created perverse 
incentives that led to dependency. The findings from this study show 
that we once again have a safety net with perverse incentives. Self-
sufficiency and independence can lead to downward financial 
trajectories for families who were on a path towards upward mobility, 
but do not have the tools and resources of financial resilience to 
weather small emergencies.  
As more scholarship utilizes in-depth interviews to consider 
existing data that point to areas of structural concern for poverty and 
inequality, we will be able to better understand how these structures 
become sources of personal meaning and determinants of behavior for 
 
not trust banks); Greene, supra note 15, at 583 (explaining the distrust of banks of low-income 
respondents in the study). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that 
approximately 20% “of lower income U.S. households—almost 7 million households earning 
below $30,000 per year—do not currently have a bank account.” See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 4 (2009). Further, approximately 41.1% of unbanked households believe that opening 
a bank account in the future is “not likely at all.” Id. 
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people who experience and internalize such conditions. Indeed, 
inquiries of this type may lead to unexpected connections and bridges 
for exploration, and ultimately to innovative policy interventions. 
This Article incorporates both lessons from the findings from this 
study and data from existing projects to argue that a new innovation is 
needed for the public safety net, one that takes into account the 
narrative perspective and supports, rather than hinders, those who 
have adopted a self-sufficiency narrative. The program would provide 
financial planning, small loans, debt management help, and emergency 
financial services in order to lead families on a road to financial 
resilience. Recall that when President Bill Clinton announced the 
welfare reform bill in 1996 he said, “Today the Congress will vote on 
legislation that gives us a chance . . . to transform a broken system that 
traps too many people in a cycle of dependence to one that emphasizes 
work and independence.” However, as data from this study 
demonstrate, welfare reform did not create a system that ultimately 
allowed families to pursue a path towards independence while 
remaining financially resilient. A new reform is needed, one like 
FSFS—one that responds to what families have said they need and 
want, and truly allows for a system that rewards and supports work and 
independence. 
